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 1 
Summary 
In the wake of the globalization, international tax planning structures has 
become vital for US investors in order to meet economic challenges and to 
survive on the competitive market. This research indicates that countries in 
Europe, such as Sweden and Switzerland, provide a favourable environment 
for US multinational corporations to set up holding companies as a way to 
enjoy benefits of legal tax planning. In a time when cash-strapped 
governments across Europe are struggling with its economy, complex tax 
planning structures by i.e. Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Google, and 
Starbucks, have been criticized and deemed ‘immoral’. OECD, The 
European Commission, and governments are pushing for a comprehensive 
action plan to counter tax planning. The scope of the Swedish tax rules 
concerning limitations on deductibility of interest payments were extended 
to as per 1 January 2013. This means that restrictions on interest expenses 
apply on any loan within an affiliated group, whatever its purpose. This is 
where we are to today. Notably, it is of importance to separate the legal and 
the moral aspects. Whether or not US multinational corporations avoid US 
taxes by using legal tax planning loopholes, they are not doing anything 
illegal. From a legal perspective, it has been shown that this it is not only a 
unilateral issue, instead it is a question how to reconcile international tax 
law with an ever-changing business environment.  
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Sammanfattning 
Genom globaliseringen har internationell skatteplanering blivit betydelsefull 
för amerikanska investerare i syfte att möta de ekonomiska utmaningarna 
och för att överleva på den konkurrenskraftiga marknaden. Studien visar att 
Europeiska länder, som exempelvis Sverige och Schweiz, erbjuder en 
fördelaktig holding regim för amerikanska multinationella företag som 
därmed kan skatteplanera enligt lagreglerna. I dagsläget strävar regeringar 
runt om i Europa för att lyckas upprätthålla dess ekonomi, komplexa 
skatteplaneringsstrukturer som genomförts av Apple, Amazon, Facebook, 
Google och Starbucks har därmed kritiserats för att vara ’omoraliska’. För 
närvarande arbetar OECD, EU-kommissionen och regeringar för att 
motverka skatteplanering. Den 1 januari 2013 infördes de nya svenska 
skattereglerna gällande begränsningar av avdragsrätten för räntebetalningar. 
Dessa innebär att restriktioner för räntekostnader tillämpas på lån inom en 
närstående grupp, oavsett syfte. Oavsett vilket resultat som kommer uppnås 
är det av yttersta vikt att särskilja den juridiska och moraliska aspekteten. 
Huruvida amerikanska multinationella företag undviker att betala skatt i 
USA genom att använda kryphål i länders olika skattelagstiftningar, är inte 
ett olagligt förfarande. Ur ett rättsligt perspektiv, har det visat sig att detta 
inte är en ensidig fråga utan istället är det en fråga om hur man ska förena 
internationell skatterätt med en ständig föränderlig omvärld.  
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Abbreviations 
CCCTB Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base 
CFA Committee of Fiscal Affairs 
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EPS Earnings per Share 
ETR Effective Tax Rate 
The Commission The European Commission 
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 (Societas Europaea) 
EU   European Union 
FTC   Foreign Tax Credit 
Holding-PE   Permanent Holding Establishment   
Income Tax Act  Inkomstskattelag (1999:1229) 
IRC   Internal Revenue Code 
LLC   Limited Liability Corporation 
LOB   Limitation of Benefits 
LP   Limited Partnership 
MNC   Multinational Corporation 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
OECD Model Treaty OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and Capital 
SFTA Swiss Federal Tax Administration 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union  
UK   United Kingdom 
US    United States 
USC   US Code 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
In order to meet the economic challenges in a world of globalization and 
overlapping tax jurisdiction, United States (“US”) multinational 
corporations (“MNCs”) are exercising legitimate international tax planning. 
The purposes with tax planning are dual: Primarily, to eliminate double 
taxation in an international business context, and secondly to minimize the 
overall tax liability of the specific company or MNC with the intention to 
maximize its profits.
1
  Recent news stories have reported about the growing 
perception of European governments, the dissatisfaction of losing 
substantial corporate tax revenues due to the ability of global companies to 
shift profits to tax havens or to low-tax jurisdictions. UK and France 
describe the complex tax planning scheme as “immoral” at a time when 
cash-strapped governments across Europe are struggling with its economy. 
One of the concerns is the capacity of MNCs to choose where to put their 
costs and profits, which gives them an unfair tax advantage that might harm 
businesses within the EU. The ongoing debate in the mainstream media has 
emphasized tax planning by MNCs such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, 
Google, and Starbucks. These MNCs are being accused of dodging taxes 
worldwide. By operating in Europe they can base themselves in any of the 
27 nations of the European Union (“EU”).  
 
Business leaders often argue that the have a responsibility towards their 
shareholders to legally reduce the taxes their companies paid.
2
 Although, it 
is important to keep in mind that corporations also have a responsibility 
against the society, the corporate social responsibility. The California based 
search giant, Google, is one of the most criticized MNCs. According to the 
generous 12.5 % corporation tax rate offered by the Irish government, 
Google has established its international headquarters in Dublin.  
The beauty of this concept is that Google earns profits in several countries, 
such as United Kingdom (“UK”), and transfers the revenues to its European 
headquarter in Ireland and thereby scales down its corporation tax payments 
in the UK.
3
 
 
Every major US MNC tries to minimize its cost by setting up subsidiaries in 
low-tax jurisdictions or tax havens as a way to lower its tax burden. Without 
such tactics, MNCs federal tax bill in the US would likely been higher. 
These companies have had complicated tax structures for decades, but have 
recently been under fire in the mainstream media according to the tide of the 
                                                 
1
 Rolf Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 11 ff. 
2
 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (OECD Publishing 2013) 13. 
3
 David Meyer, ‘Google’s Schmidt very proud of tax avoidance scheme’ (ZDNet, 13 
December 2012) <http://www.zdnet.com/uk/googles-schmidt-very-proud-of-tax-avoidance-
scheme-7000008733/> accessed 20 April 2013. 
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public opinion has visibly changed. In an era of deep public spending cuts 
and real austerity, the tax planning issue has more impact than pre-financial 
crises. There is a risk that familiar brands will endure reputational damage 
and thereby boycotted by the public. While both individuals and domestic 
corporations argue that they have always been a top rate tax payer and pay 
them in full, so why are not the MNCs doing that?
4
 From an US MNCs 
perspective, EU is pushing companies into treating EU as a single market. 
That is, EU actually wants foreign investors to set up just one corporate 
structure in just one single EU Member State, and then uses that single 
structure to service their customers in every EU country. So when Google 
decide to sell its digital goods through Ireland this is not a violence of any 
tax principle or immoral, because Google is paying its taxes in both Ireland 
and UK (where it has its subsidiary).
5
 While the company’s tax structure has 
been heavily condemned by lawmakers around the world, Google’s 
chairman, Erik Schmidt, defend the company’s complex tax arrangements 
by saying; 
 
“We pay lots of taxes; we pay them in the legally prescribed 
ways. I am very proud of the structure that we set up. We did it 
based on the incentives that the governments offered us to 
operate. It’s called capitalism. We are proudly capitalistic. I’m 
not confused about this. To go back to shareholders and say; We 
looked at 200 countries but felt sorry for those British people so 
we want to pay them more, there is probably some law against 
doing that.”6  
 
However, tackling tax planning is a complex issue because of the 
constraints of EU law, meaning that establishing a holding company in a tax 
haven or a low-tax jurisdiction cannot be viewed as immoral if the company 
is actual carrying out genuine economic activities. BusinessEurope, a 
lobbying group
7
 representing companies, called for a simplification of the 
tax system across Europe. Some tax regimes have been accused to 
encourage tax planning. Switzerland is one of the non-EU states, whose 
policies are not in line with the Code of Conduct of Business Taxation.
8
 
 
                                                 
4
 Vanessa Barford and Gerry Holt, ‘Google, Amazon, Starbucks: The Rise of Tax Shaming’ 
(BBC News Magazine, 4 December 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-
20560359> assessed 12 May 2013. 
5
 Tim Worstall, ‘Google’s Tax Dodging Ways’ (Forbes, 13 August 2013) 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/08/13/googles-tax-dodging-ways/> 
assessed 12 May 2013. 
6
 Brian Womack, ‘Google Chairman Says Android Winning Mobile War with Apple: Tech’ 
(Bloomberg, 12 December 2012) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-12/google-
chairman-says-android-winning-mobile-war-with-apple-tech.html> accessed 15 April 2013.  
7
 http://www.businesseurope.eu/Content/Default.asp? 
8
 Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN), ‘The Code of Conduct for 
Business Taxation’ (Resolution) 1 December 1997. 
The Code is not a legally binding instrument but it does clearly have a political force. By 
adopting this Code, the Member States are obliged to roll back existing tax measures that 
constitute harmful tax competition and refrain from introducing any such measures in the 
future.  
 7 
Currently, The European Commission (“the Commission”) is pushing for a 
significant reinforcement of EU’s defence tax planning schemes, including 
better information exchange and transparency to counter international tax 
planning. A new framework would results in a tougher definition of what 
constitutes a tax haven and then suspend double taxation agreements with 
such countries, which means that MNCs no longer can use them to escape 
corporate taxes.
9
 In that light, there is only one way for governments to 
make a change, to modernize and harmonize present tax legislation to be in 
accordance with the business environment.
10
 
 
1.2 Purpose 
The objective of the paper is to analyze the legal effects of tax planning 
strategies made by US multinational corporations, such as establishing 
holding companies in Sweden and Switzerland. Also, the research attempts 
to describe the content of recent tax planning ideas by US corporations that 
have been reported in the mainstream media lately.  
 
1.3 Method and Material 
The research is based on a traditional legal dogmatic method combined with 
a comparative approach. Also, this study contains essential features of a law 
and an economic perspective. 
 
By practicing a dogmatic method on legal research it is primarily necessary 
to study domestic tax regimes in Sweden and Switzerland. However, 
domestic tax rules are generally limited by tax treaties and EU law. Double 
taxation treaties are international agreements and their formation and 
consequences are codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.
11
 Tax treaties entered between US-Sweden and US-Switzerland are 
of importance in this study. EU law consists of primary and secondary 
sources of law. The former includes EU founding treaties, for instance the 
Treaty on the Function of the European Union
12
 (“TFEU”), while the latter 
include different norms issued by EU organs. In this case, essential 
                                                 
9
 James Shotter and Vanessa Houlder, ‘Europe plans action on corporate tax avoidance’ 
(Financial Times, 18 November 2012) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fb4727bc-30d3-
11e2-a11a-00144feabdc0.html> accessed 5 March 2012. 
10
 Tim Worstall, ‘Google’s Tax Dodging Ways’ (Forbes, 13 August 2013) 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/08/13/googles-tax-dodging-ways/> 
assessed 12 May 2013. 
11
 Antonio Vázquez del Rey, ‘Double Taxation Conventions’ in Andrea Amatucci (ed), 
International Tax Law (Kluwer Law International 2012) 154. 
12
 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), Consolidated Version, 
OJ 2008 C 115/47.  
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secondary law consists of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
13
 and the Interest 
and Royalty Directive
14
 when examining tax planning through holding 
companies based in Europe. Moreover, non-legally binding soft law 
measures such as guidelines, declarations and opinions might create legal 
effects. Hence, initiatives by The Organisation for Economic and 
Development (“OECD”) can be considered as political commitments. 
Indeed, some of them become de facto standards i.e. the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and Capital (“OECD Model Treaty”). Also, this 
thesis addresses relevant case law for US investors settled by the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”). In addition, the study is also dependent on legal 
doctrine and articles in order for the writer to achieve a suitable and 
innovative analysis 
 
The interest for US as such, is not only the high corporate tax rate of 35%, 
but also that the country is one of the largest economies in the world. For 
US investors, Europe is a great place to set up holding companies. Once a 
US MNC has earned profits it has several options how to use them. One 
way is to reinvest the funds in Europe, and thereby deferring these profits 
from US taxation. Another alternative is to routing the income to companies 
outside of Europe or US, and lastly, repatriating the gains to US.
15
 An 
essential part of tax planning is the selection of a suitable location, which 
depends on several elements. As known, Switzerland is not a member of EU 
and has traditionally been a prime location for MNCs according to its strong 
tax competition advantages. In turn, the introduction of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive
16
 was a milestone in the harmonization of EU taxation. 
Sweden, as a Member State, was thereby predicted to be one of the most 
favorable countries to set up a holding company. In the absence of 
international tax laws, a comparative approach applies between legislation 
in Sweden and Switzerland in order to ascertain whether tax planning 
through holding companies in Europe is an advantageous strategy to 
maximize the net income of a US MNC. English is not an official language 
of the Swiss Confederation, which confines accessible Swiss tax legislation. 
As an alternative the research relies on secondary sources, such as 
guidelines and various publications issued by the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration (“SFTA”). These sources are though considered to be 
reliable as they are published by the Swiss government or upon its request.   
 
As indicated above, international tax planning is vital to help MNCs to stay 
alive in times of global competition. Tax planning is a legitimate activity of 
                                                 
13
 Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003 amending Directive 90/435/EEC 
on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and 
subsidiaries of different Member States [2003] OJ L007/41. 
14
 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation 
applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different 
Member States [2003] OJ L157/49. 
15
 Rolf Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 2. 
16
 Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003 amending Directive 90/435/EEC 
on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and 
subsidiaries of different Member States [2003] OJ L007/41. 
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MNCs. However, base erosion and profit shifting have become a tricky one 
for governments within Europe. By providing an economic substance 
(offices, infrastructure, and law-makers), Swiss holding regime is an 
evergreen location for US MNCs. Meanwhile, OECD is addressing a 
comprehensive action plan towards tax planning with the main purpose to 
provide countries with instruments, both domestic and international, aiming 
to align the right to tax with real economic activity.
17
 On this basis, a law 
and economic approach is suitable, analyzing whether lawmakers within the 
EU have to take steps towards regimes that control capital flowing from 
high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions.   
 
1.4 Delimitations  
The study is concentrated to outbound transactions, namely, foreign 
business operations and investments by US persons. Foreign corporations 
based in the US are excluded in this context and will not be discussed, the 
so-called inbound transactions.  
 
International standard to set prices for related-party transactions is based on 
the arm’s length principle. This principle requires that prices for goods and 
services exchanged by related parties should be the same if the parties were 
independent acting in the same or similar circumstances.
18
 Fiscal authorities 
are allowed to adjust gross income, deductions and credits between related 
taxpayers to the extent necessary to prevent actions aiming to escape taxes. 
Even though this is a significant subject, the research is not covering 
transfer pricing issues.  
 
EU law, domestic tax law and tax treaties are the starting point of this thesis. 
US tax law does not provide for a specific holding company regime, thus an 
US holding company would be taxed of the entire worldwide income tax 
rate for 35%. Instead, it is more advantageous to establishing a holding 
company abroad and route the worldwide income of a US MNC via such a 
foreign entity. Yet this company has to comply with several US conditions 
when repatriating income of the foreign holding company.
19
 Direct foreign 
investments made by US MNCs will though be largely examined from an 
US law approach and discussed below in section 6.  
 
Even though the study contains a law and economic approach, it will 
exclude financial calculations.  
 
                                                 
17
 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD Publishing 2013) 8. 
18
 Raffaele Russo and others, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning (IBFD 
Publications BV 2007) 34 ff.  
19
 Rolf Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 361. 
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1.5 Terminology 
By a “foreign direct investment” is meant an investment made by a 
company or entity based in the US, into a company or entity in another 
country, called the foreign affiliate and foreign subsidiary.  
 
The term “investor” will be referred to as a business.   
The concept “tax haven” is a well debated subject. Since there is no modern 
exclusive definition of the term tax havens, the idea of tax haven rests on a 
comparison of tax burdens in two different countries, which makes the 
notion in itself extremely relative. Researchers and policymakers have 
presented several features that constitute a tax haven, meaning that both 
Sweden and Switzerland can be regarded as tax haven locations. All in all, it 
depends on the main characteristics of the country where the holding 
company is established, and the preferences of the investor. In this context 
the notion should not be viewed with suspicious, but as a legal tax planning 
method for MNCs. 
 
In this study, a “Contracting State” entails a state that has accepted the terms 
of a contract (i.e. member state of a Union or Association of States). 
 
1.6 Disposition 
The introductory part of the thesis will initiate with a descriptive part of the 
present concerns in Europe; US MNCs using complex corporate structures 
in Europe with the purpose to optimize tax payments and boost profits. The 
political backlash relies on the perception of governments in Europe, 
arguing that paying an appropriate amount of tax in the country in which 
profits are made is not only a matter of basic economics, but also a matter of 
morality.
20
 By contrast, Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Starbucks 
are pointing out that they pay their corporations taxes in the states they are 
supposed to. In effect, the subject as such, has been heavily debated between 
politicians and US MNCs.  
 
Next section strives to describe characteristics of a holding company, its 
core advantages and several strategic ways to implement holding 
companies. The phenomenon of tax heavens is difficult to grasp, due to the 
variety between tax heavens. Indeed, tax heavens are condemned very 
subjective in nature, as ‘one man’s tax heaven is another man’s tax system’. 
The features and considerations regarding the ideal holding location are 
discussed in this section.
21
   
                                                 
20
 Peter Gumbel, ‘How U.S Firms like Google and Amazon Minimize Their European 
Taxes’ (Time, 4 December 2012) 
<http://business.time.com/2012/12/04/how-u-s-firms-like-google-and-amazon-minimize-
their-european-taxes/> accessed 4 February 2013.  
21
 Rolf Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 87. 
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The following part examines domestic tax regimes in Sweden and 
Switzerland. Participation exemption on capital gains and dividends, thin 
capitalization rules, tax credits, withholding tax, Controlled Foreign 
Corporations (“CFC”) rules, double tax treaties, and further will be 
scrutinized from a comparative approach in this section.  
 
This reading also provides a briefly description of US provisions a foreign 
holding company must comply with when repatriating profits.  
 
In this light, the overall goal is to analyze whether European countries, such 
as Sweden and Switzerland, are profitable options for US MNC’s when 
establishing a holding company, and if so, are the domestic legislations too 
lax? Also, this part strives to provide improvements and means, in order to 
decrease the clash between politics and business leaders. Finally, the last 
section provides a conclusion with some final remarks from the analysis.  
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2 Holding Companies – 
Charactersitics and Concepts 
2.1 Key Elements of Holding Companies 
The essentially commercial purpose of a holding company is particularly to 
own or manage a group of affiliates or subsidiaries in a specific region in a 
long term. Holding structures intend to optimizing distribution of profits and 
financing other companies. A pure definition of a holding company does not 
exist. Instead it is a form of practical organization. In some tax jurisdictions 
this organizational form is not only accepted, but also privileged.
22
 The 
main features of a holding structure will be clarified below.  
 
The ideal holding company provides legal capacity in order to conclude its 
own contracts with subsidiaries to effectively manage its rights and duties 
derived from the shareholding. It should be noted that a holding company is 
in charge of the central responsibilities of the MNC, thus to positioning the 
effectiveness of the entire group. Mere holding companies have no 
operative role, which facilitate the harmonization of the holding and 
improve the process of decision-making. Bundling all activities in a holding 
company creates more stability than non-holding structures, due to the 
permanent financial attachment. While a holding company possesses skills 
as flexibility and elasticity, it is also in charge of the management of the 
entire group. This means that it can react quickly to changes regarding legal 
frameworks. In the end, the holding structure often leads to a decentralized 
group structure.
23
 
 
2.2 Use of Holding Companies 
The vital motives behind a holding structure are mainly tax and legal 
reasons, in particular, tax purposes. It is worth mentioning that a major legal 
reason for using a holding structure is the liability and the separation of 
risks.
24
 However, tax planning via a holding company is a method to 
enhance tax and financial efficiencies of a MNC.  Another use of a holding 
regime is a family-owned holding company, which is usually constituted in 
order to control family equity. The organization is quickly to set up and a 
method to reduce taxes and costs. That is why so many families intend to be 
opting for a holding company structure as a limited liability company 
(“LLC”) or a limited partnership (“LP”). Consequently, a partnership 
                                                 
22
 Rolf Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 35 ff.  
23
 Ibid. 37 ff. 
24
 Rolf Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 53. 
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provides an election of pass-through taxation, so that no holding company 
taxation applies.
25
 Holding companies are also intended to facilitate the tax 
damage caused by the civil law concept. Literally, a civil law perspective 
regards a group of companies as one economic entity. In an international tax 
law context each of these companies are independently subject to taxation. 
The outcome of the latter perception leads to the result that the sum of taxes 
of all group companies added together is higher than the taxes the MNC as 
whole would pay, which depends on the difference in the multiple 
recognitions of the same economic circumstances.
26
 
The legal doctrine highlights factors that have a major impact on the 
decision whether or not a holding company is established. The main motive 
behind a holding company structure is generally beyond tax considerations. 
A common business approach is the advantages of a centralization of 
several participations under one holding company in order to facilitate their 
management and to ensure better business results.
27
 Some core advantages 
of holding companies are the following: 
 enabling access to EU Directives and tax treaties as a way to achieve 
reduction of withholding taxes on dividends, royalties and interest 
payments; 
 positioning the company to more effectively financing 
participations; 
 exemption from tax on dividends; 
 use of tax credits; 
 increased financial flexibility and the creation of an efficient vehicle 
for the taxpayer to obtain access to privileges provided by a foreign 
tax regime; 
 a gateway for future growth and expanding business operations in 
new markets and regions; 
 a platform concerning future structural changes, such as acquisitions, 
joint ventures and other business opportunities; and 
 synergy effects due to the higher power of supply and demand, 
namely economies of scales. 
Observe that the above-cited reasons are merely illustrative and the list is 
not exhausted. It depends on the particular facts and circumstances in each 
case whether or not a holding regime can improve the tax and financial 
efficiencies of a MNC.
28
 
 
                                                 
25
 Joshua Kennon, ‘How a Holding Company Works’ (Joshua Kennon: Thoughts on 
Business, Politics & Life from a Private Investor, 21 October 2010) 
<http://www.joshuakennon.com/how-a-holding-company-works/> accessed 20 March 
2013.  
26
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Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 53. 
27
 Ibid. 55.  
28
 Raffaele Russo and others, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning (IBFD 
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2.3 Risks of Holding Companies  
Globalization triggers a tendency of companies to move beyond national 
markets to international markets, and thereby enable companies to 
optimizing their production and minimizing their costs. Today as never 
before, MNCs are facing more complex problems than ever due to the 
global scale. Tax planning and compliance have become more complex 
because of the globalization of markets, new business models, ever-
changing operating environments, ongoing changes in a competitive market 
and the regulatory environment and, the impact of culture and new 
technologies. The establishment of a holding company might generate both 
tax opportunities and risks. Due to the fact that MNCs are not taxed as one 
single entity, an accurate analysis of the company’s business model and 
transactions is suitable. Also, by reconciling tax planning and the 
company’s management will create opportunities for financial efficiencies 
and savings. Conversely, by not doing so can result in missed opportunities 
and shape unnecessary and potentially significant tax risks.
29
   
 
2.4 Legal Forms 
Qualified to constitutes a holding company are corporations, partnerships, 
foundations, trusts, permanent establishment, and individual persons. 
Depending on the importance of each of the above stated features in section 
2.2, the taxpayer can choose one favorable legal form. Typically, the 
election is governed by factors such as the capital structure, capital finance, 
liability, accounting, auditing, and tax law. The crucial question is for the 
taxpayer to find an appropriate legal form. In the legal doctrine, a two-step 
approach has been endorsed. First, the legal form of the holding company 
has to be considered from the national tax law approach of the intended 
country. The legal form of the foreign subsidiaries has a decisive impact on 
this decision. Secondly, unilateral and bilateral measures aimed to avoid 
double taxation have to be evaluated, both the tax law of the holding regime 
and the tax law of the states where the subsidiaries are located. Below, 
numerous legal forms of holding regimes are scrutinized.
30
  
 
2.4.1 Corporation 
The most common holding structure is based on the traditional legal form; 
corporation. The primary argument for this form rests on the international 
homogeneity of the corporate and tax structure. Additionally, corporations 
                                                 
29
 Raffaele Russo and others, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning (IBFD 
Publications BV 2007) 71 ff. 
30
 Rolf Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 38 ff. 
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guarantee stability because the change of shareholder has a little impact on 
the organization of the holding company.
31
  
 
2.4.2 Partnership 
Another legal form is partnership, which is frequently used by venture 
capital and private equity investors because of its flexibility. In most cases 
shareholders are managing the partnership, thus it is easy to adapt changes. 
Since the influence of the shareholders on the organization of a partnership 
is higher than in a corporation, the partnership holding regime tends to be 
more unstable. Goals of the holding company and the shareholders are 
hardly autonomous, and since the shareholders rights and the competence of 
the management are ordinarily separated from each other, this legal form 
might struggle with inside group interests. Additionally, the main 
disadvantage is that partnerships do not qualify for international tax treaties 
and EU law, and thereby they cannot avoid withholding tax.
32
  
 
Cross-border partnerships have been a crucial issue in international tax law. 
Some countries’ domestic tax regimes consider partnerships as transparent 
and do not treat them as a separate taxpaying entity. Thus, partnership 
income and deductions “flow through” to the individual partners, whether 
they are natural or juridical entities, and tax them in accordance with present 
tax principles, in this case under US law.
33
 While in other countries 
partnerships are treated as a separate taxable person under the tax scheme of 
one country.
34
   
 
For instance, the US income tax system applies to corporations, trusts, 
partnerships and certain hybrid entities
35
. Under the Treasury Regulations 
(“check-the-box”), certain corporations are always classified as 
corporations. From an US law perspective, entities incorporated under state 
corporate law and insurance companies are embraced. However, if an entity 
is not per se determined to be a corporation under the check-the-box 
scheme, these rules provide the owner to decide whether the entity will be 
treated and taxed as a corporation or a partnership.  Once the classification 
issue has been resolved, the next step is to determine whether the entity is 
domestic or foreign.
36
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32
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 Paul Mc Daniel and Hugh Ault, Introduction to United States International Taxation 
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In international tax law, the US check-the-box regulations have been used as 
an excellent investment planning tool because no entity level tax is imposed 
on profits.
37
 Check-the-box regime will be examined in section 6.2. One 
result of the elective regime in the US is a situation when US identifies the 
entity as a partnership, while another country classifies it as a corporation, 
also so called hybrid entities.
38
  
 
2.4.3 Foundation 
By contrast to a partnership, a foundation is a legal form that is extremely 
stable concerning its structure and organization. As capital and management 
are separated, a foundation is suitable when the goal is to centralize the 
interest of the group. However, this legal form is not flexible at all when the 
structure and policy must be modified.
39
  
 
2.4.4 Permanent Establishment as Holding 
A permanent holding establishment (“Holding-PE”) is a wide concept for 
tax purposes. Primarily this kind of unit is eligible to hold participations, 
enabling the taxpayers to convert dividend income into business earnings. In 
general terms, the advantage of this regime is no imposition of withholding 
taxes on business profits.
40
 From a tax treaty approach, Holding-PE is a 
vehicle that can reduce additional tax liabilities caused by international 
cross-border taxation. In order to be recognized as a Holding-PE, the OECD 
Model Treaty and national tax regimes demand a business activity, such as 
participation controlling, distribution, or marketing. Also, the participations 
must be “effectively connected” to the Holding-PE. Notably, OECD has 
implemented a functionally separate entity approach, which requires a 
functional connection of the participation.
41
 
 
2.4.5 European Company (Societas Europaea) 
It is also worth mentioning a special form of corporation, namely European 
company, also called Societas Europaea (“SE”). The SE is governed by the 
rules applicable to domestic public limited companies, which is recognized 
in all Member States of the EU. From a US perspective, this legal form is 
established as a corporation, and is hence ineligible under the check-the-box 
                                                 
37
 Paul Mc Daniel and Hugh Ault, Introduction to United States International Taxation 
(4th, Kluwer Law International 1998) 28. 
38
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39
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regulations. Typically, the benefits of the SE are largely that SE can transfer 
its registered offices between the Member States unimpeded by tax 
conditions. The formation might take place in a cross-border merger, and 
the corporate government structure is flexible, as it can both be chosen 
between a one-tier board scheme and a two-tier board scheme. Still, this 
legal form require a complex legal framework, therefore, only large 
multinational corporations are recommended this structure.
42
 
 
2.5 Functional Classifications 
The variety to implement a holding company is based on its tasks and 
functions on the one hand, and due to its position within the group on the 
other hand. This type of classification has no legal consequences, but it 
helps to understand the tasks the holding company performs. In the sections 
below, the most significant classifications are examined.
43
   
 
2.5.1 Management Holding Company 
A management holding company is in charge of all strategic decisions, and 
in some circumstances, the operative decisions as well. Under this model, 
the holding company coordinates the affairs of the group, influences the 
management decisions of the subsidiaries, defines the practice area of the 
business, and control the cash flow within the MNC.
44
 
 
2.5.2 Finance Holding Company 
Another type of classification is the finance holding company that provides 
financial services for all related companies, with the aim to reduce finance 
costs, administrative costs, and achieve access to international capital 
markets. By establishing a finance holding company, the worldwide 
effective tax rate (“ETR”) of the MNC decrease. Additionally, the market 
power of the finance holding company receives preferable conditions for 
funding with credits and equity than a subsidiary. In contrast to the 
management holding company, it follows that a finance holding company 
has no active leadership functions in terms of strategy planning. A delicate 
finance holding location is typically characterized by the lack of CFC rules, 
a professional banking sector and no restrictions on the deduction of finance 
expenses. However, this structure is merely coherent if the tax burden in the 
country which the holding resides is lower than in the countries where the 
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parent and subsidiary are located. In that case the finance holding company 
governs the overall tax burden.
45
 
 
There are several weaknesses of this kind of holding company, first, the risk 
of being subject to the CFC rules.
46
 Secondly, the hazard of the proposed 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (“CCCTB”), which is a single 
set of rules that companies operating within the EU could use to calculate 
their taxable income. A company or a MNC would then only have to 
comply with just one EU system in order to computing its taxable income, 
rather than use different tax rules in the Member States which they are 
active.
47
  
 
2.5.3 Euro-Holding Company 
One central classification form is the Euro-holding company. This might be 
the first choice for US investors with the motive to reduce the overall tax 
burden of a MNC. Basically, the Euro-holding company is located in a 
country of the EU and intervened between a non-EU parent company and 
the EU subsidiaries.
48
 The bottom line of this structure is the advantage of 
the absence of withholding taxes on dividends, interest, and royalties 
between companies located in EU provided by the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive and the Interest Royalty Directive.
49
  
 
To achieve tax savings by means of tax planning, US investors have to 
ensure that its Euro-holding company performs some business activity or is 
based on sound economic motives other than pure tax reasons. A mere 
passive holding of participations would likely trigger national anti-
avoidance rules.
50
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2.5.4 Country Holding Company 
Briefly, a country holding company desires to collect all income from its 
subsidiaries in one particular country. The use of the holding lies in the 
function as a group parent to set off profits and losses of these 
subsidiaries.
51
 
 
2.5.5 Mixed Holding Company  
Seemingly, a mixed holding company does not merely hold participations, 
but also accomplishes actual business activities, which can be similar to a 
management holding company.
52
  
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
Generally, the perception of the society connects holding companies to tax 
havens, money laundering, tax evasion, and abuse of power. From a 
business point of view, holding companies implies rather an establishment 
of effective management structure as a method to minimize costs.
53
 In that 
light, an integrated global structure should ensure the ability to achieve a 
sustainable reduction of the MNC’s ETR. Usually holding companies take 
the legal form of a corporation, which offers stability, flexibility, and 
manage the interest of the group. Additionally, a holding structure is mainly 
used both for legal aspects as tax purposes. The clash between the civil law 
concept of groups of companies and the tax law model can leads to a higher 
overall tax liability. Nevertheless the use of a holding company provides 
many opportunities, but also many risks. Thereby it is worthwhile to analyze 
the MNC in a broader context, not only to achieve efficiencies and savings, 
but also to avoid significant tax risks. However, the tax advantages of the 
holding regime are overwhelming, which explains the increasing 
implementation of holdings in practice.
54
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3 Tax Planning with Holding 
Companies 
3.1 Features of a Holding Company 
Jurisdiction 
Tax considerations are highly relevant when selecting a holding company 
location, but not the only issue.  
 
The primary tax criteria for deciding on the location of a holding company 
are:
55
 
 
 exemptions for dividends and capital gains shares on the disposal of 
shares; 
 no or low withholding taxes on incoming and outgoing dividends; 
 no capital duty on capital contributions;56 
 no share transfer taxes;57 
 deduction of financing costs (no debt-equity restrictions), goodwill 
and current-value depreciation; 
 limited anti-avoidance legislation; 
 advantageous tax treaties; 
 no CFC-legislation; and 
 low corporate income tax rates. 
 
A suitable holding location also consists of non-tax elements, namely: 
 
 “government attitude towards foreign investment; 
 infrastructure 
 labor force 
 economic conditions 
 political risks; and  
 environmental regulations”.58 
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Mostly there is no perfect holding jurisdiction for a MNC that meets all of 
the above stipulated criteria. The pros and cons of a particular jurisdiction 
depend on every individual case, which makes this decision-making process 
so complex. A successful tool to use when to choose holding jurisdiction is 
a ‘Balanced Scorecard’. The ‘Balanced Scorecard’ is a table which contains 
all possible jurisdictions and all decisive factors for the case in question. 
Eicke recommended the following procedure: 
 
 “identification of the goal pursued with transaction, structure and 
investment; 
 listing the factors relevant to the obtaining of this goal; 
 weighting these factors by attributing maximum obtainable points; 
 identification of ‘knock-out features’, and must therefore be 
eliminated from the list; 
 awarding points to each factor and each country and describing in a 
few words the reason for the score; 
 adding-up the points; 
 interpretation of the final result, in particular the point difference 
between the highest ranked countries; and  
 selection of the best location.”59 
 
Another noticeable issue to consider is if the holding company of the MNC 
is intended to be the headquarters in Europe. Then the following elements 
must be considered: 
 
 “location of current EU or regional management; 
 location of significant EU or regional operations; 
 countries in which the organization operates; 
 proximity of airports; 
 language barriers; 
 cost of living; 
 individual tax rates; and 
 international schools.”60 
 
Countries strive to become an attractive holding jurisdiction for MNCs 
because the holding companies provide workforce and develop the local 
economy, and actually increase tax revenue.
61
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3.2 The Tax Planning Model  
A key determinant of shareholder value
62
 is the earnings per share (“EPS”). 
It is notable that the ETR, as reported in the MNC’s financial statement, 
influence the EPS and therefore has a direct impact on the shareholders’ 
value. But to achieve a positive impact on EPS, significant tax savings must 
be made. In order to keep the ultimate goal in sight, tax planning should be 
integral to lager business events and thereby it is likely that business 
benefits extending far beyond tax savings.
63
 In that light, an international tax 
planning strategy comprises five major stages, namely: benchmarking the 
status quo, analyzing possible options to make a change, and select a 
strategy that after the implementation will henceforth be subject to a 
compliance test.
64
 This strategy is briefly discussed below. 
 
3.2.1 Benchmarking 
An important first step in devising a global tax strategy is to make an 
assessment of the MNC’s ETR in relation to its peers and evaluate the profit 
and tax drivers of the MNC.
65
 By reviewing benchmark information of the 
MNC and other companies in the same peer group, some conclusions for the 
MNC’s own current position can be derived. Benchmark information can 
provide insight into potential process improvements, value enhancement and 
cost savings opportunities.
66
 Benchmarking of global tax efficiency is the 
best way to conclude whether tax cost can or should be reduced.
67
 The 
major ETR drivers persist of structural and cultural factors. The former refer 
to the ability to perform tax planning globally, while the latter one depends 
on the attitude of companies towards tax planning.
68
 In that light, tax 
planning aligned in the context of corporate strategy will lead to increased 
business profits and thus a MNC steps to a lower ETR.  
 
                                                 
62
 The value delivered to shareholders because of management's philosophy that regards 
maximization of the shareholders’ value as is highest objective.  The management achieve 
this goal by grow earnings of the MNC, dividends, and share price.  
63
 Raffaele Russo and others, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning (IBFD 
Publications BV 2007) 73. 
64
 Rolf Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 30. 
65
 Raffaele Russo and others, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning (IBFD 
Publications BV 2007) 74. 
66
 KPMG, ‘Being in-the-know is the best place to be. Participate in KPMG’s Tax 
Department Benchmarking Study 2.0’ (KPMG Institutes, 8 March 2013)              
<http://search.kpmginstitutes.com/?bigi=1&q=bBeing+in-the-
know+is+the+best+place+to+be.&x=0&y=0> accessed 7 May 2013. 
67
 Raffaele Russo and others, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning (IBFD 
Publications BV 2007) 74. 
68
 Rolf  Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 31. 
 23 
3.2.2 Analysis 
Primarily the analysis has the goal of revealing potential tax optimization 
options. First of all, you have to analyze the goals being pursued in the light 
of the scope (single transaction or overall tax planning), the affected levels 
(parent company, subsidiaries, shareholders) and the key drivers 
(elimination of double taxation or reduction of overall tax liability) in the 
specific situation. Secondly, the interaction and trade-offs between domestic 
and international law for the cross-border tax connections have to be 
analyzed in order to disclose potential sources of double taxation and 
potential tax savings due to elimination of double taxation.
69
 Further, the 
relationship between tax-driven and non-tax-driven is a significant part of 
the tax planning and has to be scrutinized carefully. Also, commercial 
accounts, such as IFRS and US GAAP reports, have to be evaluated because 
issues such as deferred taxes may have influence on the ETR.
70
  
 
3.2.3 Strategy 
A tax planning strategy is the core element of international tax planning and 
an important part in attaining a lower ETR.
71
 US foreign investors have two 
different strategies to consider regarding tax planning. Repatriation and 
allocation strategies can be applied separately, but they can also be 
combined which is done frequently in practice.
72
 Additionally, the scope 
with respect to time and subject-matter should be considered in details. A 
strategy of how tax planning fits into business decision is the SAVANT.
73
  
In this context the concept is an acronym for how tax planning fits into 
business decisions through Strategy, Anticipation, Value-Adding, 
Negotiation, and Transforming. In order to maximize the shareholder’s 
value of each transaction, managers must focus on the company’s strategic 
plan, anticipating tax impacts across time for all parties affected by the 
transaction. Further, managers should add value when considering these 
impacts when negotiating the most valuable arrangement, thereby 
transforming the tax treatment of items to the most favorable status.  In 
short, by using SAVANT it is possible for the MNC to generate tax-
savings.
74
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3.2.4 Implementation 
Simply, the strategy and concepts need to materialize in the process of 
implementation. Depending on the circumstances in the specific transaction, 
this can be effortless (formal paper transactions) but also demand 
intensively work.
75
 
 
3.2.5 Compliance 
In the end, the implemented model must comply with the law and business 
activities. Anti-avoidance, anti-abuse, anti-treaty shopping, thin 
capitalization, and CFC-rules are those rules that require analysis. Last but 
not least, the risks the taxpayer is willing to take must be taken into account. 
A taxpayer performing an aggressive tax planning runs a greater risk to 
jeopardize the path of legal tax planning.
76
  
 
3.3 Tax Planning Tools 
Several ways has been highlighted by Eicke regarding tax planning with 
holding companies. These scenarios are briefly discussed below in order to 
describe various methods to implement holding companies in a jurisdiction.   
 
3.3.1 Participation Exemption Shopping 
This practice implies the re-routing of income via a holding company that is 
located in a jurisdiction with an advantageous regime. To mention one 
example, rules that do not tax received dividend income derived from 
subsidiaries. Under this method the tax planner must pay close attention to 
the domestic unilateral participations exemption rules, as in many countries 
the exemption depends on a minimum holding requirement and a minimum 
holding period. Also, the provisions in the respective double tax treaties 
must be taken into account.
77
  
 
3.3.2 Capital Gains Exemption Shopping 
Similar to the above described method, a common feature of domestic 
legislation in Europe is the participation exemption for capital gains. Capital 
gains arising from the disposal of shares to a holding company, receives the 
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capital gains tax exemption.
78
 Sweden applies this exemption, where capital 
gains derived from the sales of shares in resident or non-resident companies 
are not subject to tax, provided that they constitute a business related 
holding. See section 5.1.2. 
 
3.3.3  Treaty Shopping 
Basically, the main purpose of countries in concluding tax treaties is to 
facilitate trade and investments by removing obstacles, such as double 
taxation. However, the expanded tax treaty network together with the 
interaction of foreign and domestic tax systems, the globalization of 
economies, technological developments, and the reduction in barriers to 
international trade increase the opportunity for international tax planning 
and tax avoidance.
79
  
 
OECD has expressed its concern regarding the improper use of tax treaties 
by a person acting through a company established to obtain treaty benefits 
that would not otherwise be available directly to that person. The concept is 
known as ‘treaty shopping’ and it is defined as the routing of income arising 
in one country to a business in another country through an intermediary 
country to obtain the tax advantages of tax treaties. This problem led the 
Committee of Fiscal Affairs (“CFA”) of the OECD to issue a report dealing 
with these situations. Usually, treaty shopping involves the ‘flow-through’ 
of income through conduit companies in beneficial countries. Another 
example includes triangular structures where a low taxed branch of a 
company in a treaty country receives income from a third country. A third 
example may involve the use of a hybrid entity that likely is characterized 
differently in two Contracting States.
80
  
 
Broadly, the use of tax treaties by third country residents to obtain benefits 
that are not available directly to them is lawful, unless it is not prohibited by 
treaty provisions or general international law. Despite the lawfulness of 
using tax treaties, many countries regard treaty shopping as unacceptable 
and immoral. Therefore, several jurisdictions have enacted certain anti-
treaty shopping provisions.
81
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In the wake of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive,
82
 treaty shopping has 
become a popular tool for US investors in Europe since direct profit 
distribution to the US parent are rarely the best choice. It is worth 
mentioning that powerful databases such as COMTAX
83
 are used as a treaty 
shopping tool in order to find the best suitable route to repatriate profits.
84
  
 
3.3.4 Treaty Exemption Shopping/Deferral 
Shopping 
Through treaty exemption shopping it is possible to transform non-
exempted profits into exempted profits by transferring the capital to a 
different Contracting State. Yet, this method cannot be recommended for 
repatriating profits to the US, as the country applies the credit method. 
Seemingly, deferral shopping is estimated to be an attractive alternative for 
a US foreign investor, for example the temporary transfer of income to an 
intermediate holding company. However, deferral shopping is only suitable 
if the US Subpart F regime is not applicable.
85
  
 
3.3.5 Credit Mix Shopping 
A US investor may instead initiates credit mix shopping, a method 
designated to avoid excess tax credits. In practice, the holding company 
distributes dividend income from low-tax countries in connection with 
dividend income from high-tax countries to the US parent. In order to 
achieve this purpose, the holding cannot be located in a country that applies 
the credit method.
86
  
 
3.3.6 Rule Shopping 
The attribute of rule shopping is the transformation of income. Given the 
implementation of a Holding-PE, there is an opportunity to transform 
dividend income into income of a Holding-PE. The virtue of this method is 
that such structure avoids withholding taxes and may then reduce the overall 
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tax burden if the double tax treaty in the country of the head office provides 
an exemption of PE income.
87
  
 
3.3.7 Deduction Shopping 
This measure intends to transfer losses, such as capital losses, liquidation 
losses, and losses derived from current-value depreciation to a holding 
company. However, to be allowed to use these losses it is of importance that 
the holding company has taxable income.
88
 
 
3.3.8 Cross-border Group Relief Shopping 
Also interesting is the cross-border group relief shopping concept that 
implies that a holding company is located in a country that allows 
aggregation of cross-border profits and losses. According to the decision of 
ECJ in the Marks & Spencer
89
 case, new opportunities might arise for this 
method. In short, Marks & Spencer claimed a group relief from the UK tax 
authorities for losses incurred by its subsidiaries abroad. Under the UK 
legislation resident companies in a group may set off their profits and losses 
among themselves, but not when the losses were related to the subsidiaries 
which were not resident in UK. ECJ was asked whether the UK provisions 
were compatible with the provisions in TFEU
90
, namely the freedom of 
establishment. ECJ reiterated that, despite that direct taxation falls within 
the competence of the Member States, they must exercise that competence 
with respect for EU law. By applying different treatment for tax purposes to 
losses incurred by a subsidiary in another Member State, the UK rules 
discourage companies from setting up subsidiaries in another Member State, 
and therefore constitute a violation on the freedom of establishment. 
However, the ECJ found that such restriction was only permissible if it 
meets two conditions: first, it must pursue a legitimate objective compatible 
with TFEU
91
 and be justified by overriding reasons in the public interest; if 
this is the case, then it also must be apt to ensure that the attainment of the 
objective in question not goes beyond what is necessary. According to ECJ 
there was a legitimate objective based on the need to avoid the risk of 
double losses, the desire to avoid the risk of tax avoidance and protect a 
balanced allocation of the power to impose taxation among the Member 
States. Although, ECJ considered that the second condition was not 
satisfied. The UK did not observe the principle of subsidiarity, at least in the 
following situations: where the non-resident subsidiary has exhausted the 
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possibilities available for having the losses taken into account in its state of 
residence, or where there is no possibilities for the foreign subsidiary’s 
losses to be taken into account in its state of residence for future periods 
either by the subsidiary itself or by a third party, in particular where the 
subsidiary has been sold to that third party.
92
  
 
3.3.9 Tax Rate Shopping  
A simplified method is tax rate shopping, aiming to reduce the global ETR. 
In order for this to happened, income has to be generated in low-tax 
jurisdictions and simultaneously reduce income from other companies 
within the group located in high-tax jurisdictions. Apparently this is possible 
due to the boundaries of the transfer pricing regulations and without 
triggering CFC provisions.
93
   
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
The ultimate holding company jurisdiction would not tax dividends, capital 
gains, and interest or royalty income. There would be no withholding tax on 
dividends, interest or royalty outflows and the holding jurisdiction should 
offers a strong network of double tax treaties. Given the tax drivers that 
impact a MNC’s ability to achieve a sustainable reduction in ETR, an 
integrated and comprehensive planning approach is required to address the 
many facets of international tax planning. It is of importance that MNCs 
focus on tax strategies and planning techniques that are aligned with 
business operations.
94
  
 
                                                 
92
 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), Consolidated Version, 
OJ 2008 C 115/47. 
93
 Rolf Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 51. 
94
 Raffaele Russo and others, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning (IBFD 
Publications BV 2007) 82 and 86.  
 29 
4 Tax havens and Tax 
Competition 
4.1 Characteristics of Tax haven 
Countries 
A tax haven is not a new phenomenon, as the concept span from the ancient 
Greece until today.
95
 Currently, tax havens have become an important tax-
planning tool in a multinational group of corporations, by using them to 
reduce the ETR of the MNC. Prior to this, tax havens were known as 
jurisdictions that provided taxpayers with opportunities for tax evasion. A 
decade after the OECD’s harmful tax practice initiative96 was launched, the 
role of tax havens in the international financial system has changed 
dramatically. Today, all those jurisdictions that were condemned as a tax 
haven have either implemented or have signed the internationally agreed tax 
standard. Thus, tax havens are more accepted today and the treaty network 
has grown substantially, which results in increased tax planning with tax 
havens. This gives rise to a situation of tax competition amongst countries 
worldwide.
97
 See section 4.2 about tax competition. 
 
The idea of tax haven is usually based on the comparison of tax burdens in 
two different countries, which makes the notion in itself extremely relative. 
As a result, the phenomenon of tax havens is hard to grasp and it is 
extremely difficult to develop a reliable definition that adequately takes into 
account the widespread of tax haven practices employed by different 
countries and jurisdictions.
98
  
 
Since there is no modern exclusive definition of the term tax havens, the 
general understanding among both researchers and policymakers is that this 
concept consists of several features in order to be a favourable ‘quality tax 
haven’. The specific features are:99 
 
 high standard of financial, including banking and commercial 
secrecy; 
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 no or liberal currency controls; 
 developed infrastructure; 
 available professional help, such as lawyers, auditors, accountants 
and financial analysts; and 
 low regulation of financial institutions, in particular banks and 
insurance companies. 
 
Even though this list includes the main features attributed to modern tax 
havens, it is by no means exhaustive. Some commentators argue to add: 
stable government, equitable treatment of foreigners, existence of free trade 
zones, local consumer and labor markets, investment incentives, and self-
promotion as a tax haven.
100
  
 
Although it is possible to single out particular groups within the mass of tax 
haven jurisdictions, namely:  
 
 “the so-called ‘classical’ tax havens; 
 tax havens with no tax or income from foreign sources; 
 tax havens with special (privileged) tax regimes; and 
 treaty tax havens.”101  
 
4.2 Tax Competition  
Tax competition describes as competing policies between tax jurisdictions 
by way of tax incentives and concessions to attract businesses to locate in a 
particular jurisdiction.
102
 Tax competition has exists for decades and is 
widely regarded as a legitimate tool of governments to exercise their 
sovereignty.
103
 In the wake of globalization the mobility of capital
104
 is 
linked to tax competition. Since foreign investors have the opportunity to 
choose among tax haven locations, the competitive pressures encourage 
countries with small corporate tax bases, facing potential inflows of direct 
investments, to reduce their tax rates on international businesses.
105
 The 
benefits and downsides of tax competition have been subject to an 
exhaustive ongoing debate both in politics and science. According to 
McGee’s research106, countries that have the lowest tax rates tend to have 
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the highest economic growth. One reason for that is because investment 
capital likely flow into low tax jurisdictions and out of high tax 
jurisdictions. Another reason is that the private sector can do anything more 
efficiently than the government sector. That is to say, by having more 
money in the private sector, the more efficient the economy works. Taking 
capital out of the more efficient private sector and invest it on government 
projects distorts the economy. OECD is spearheading an effort to end tax 
competition and harmonize tax rates so that all countries charge the same 
rate for doing business in their jurisdiction.
107
 Yet the clash among countries 
persists, but in the end, pros and cons of tax competition is in the eye of the 
beholder.
108
  
 
4.3 Use of Tax Havens 
The objective of a MNC is to make profit, but in most countries something 
like half of this profit is paid in direct taxes. Therefore, it is essential that the 
management of the MNC understand the tax systems of the countries in 
which the affiliates operate.
109
 Whatever the reason behind an establishment 
of a corporation in a tax haven is, it should always be borne in mind that tax 
havens provide for corporate profits to flow through to other countries with 
minimum taxation.
110
   
 
The concept ‘tax havens’ suggest that a jurisdiction allows foreigners tax 
savings
111
, which means that they can be used in three different ways:
112
 
 
 activity can take place in the tax haven; 
 activity can be signed to the haven for fiscal purposes; or 
 the tax haven can mask reality through secrecy.  
 
US MNCs frequently use tax havens as a vehicle to reallocate income from 
high-tax jurisdictions and to facilitate deferral of taxes on foreign income.
113
 
Tax haven operations of US MNCs have dramatically increased since 
1980s. It is helpful to understand the mechanics of the US tax system in 
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order to appreciate the usefulness of tax havens to US MNCs, thus the US 
tax system will be explored in chapter 6. In short, the US tax system taxes 
income on a residence basis, meaning that US individuals and businesses 
owe taxes to the US government, whether these profits are earned in the US 
or not.
114
 The present US tax system, particularly the tax credit system, 
discourage US MNCs to repatriate funds. That is to say that US MNCs 
rather use tax havens regarding allocation strategies than repatriation 
strategies. Nonetheless, tax haven activities are of valuable importance for 
US MNCs.
115
  
 
4.4 Tax Havens and Non-Haven Activity 
In some parts of the world, tax havens are viewed with suspicious. The 
concern is often based on the widespread use of tax havens, which could 
threaten the long-run sustainability of the tax base in countries with high tax 
rate.
116
 There is a considerable controversy regarding the impact of tax 
havens on high-tax countries. One may argue that it is a matter of faith that 
the economic success of tax havens comes at the expense of countries with 
high tax rates. But on the other hand, tax haven may encourage economic 
activity with positive spillovers and thereby contribute to the economic 
prosperity elsewhere. These arguments are not customarily supplemented by 
reliable empirical evidence since economic theory does not clearly indicate 
whether tax competition contributes to economic welfare or not.
117
 Thus it 
can be difficult to evaluate the impact of tax havens on economic outcomes 
in other countries.
118
  
 
The existence of several channels through which tax haven countries might 
influence the economies of high-tax countries, is for example that tax 
havens might divert investment that would otherwise have been located in 
high-tax jurisdictions. On the other hand, the existence of tax havens may 
encourage investment in non-tax havens. This could be case if the ability to 
relocate taxable income into tax havens improves the desirability of 
investing in high-tax jurisdictions, if tax haven activities facilitate deferral 
of home-country taxation of income earned somewhere else, or if tax haven 
affiliates provide significant intermediate goods and services to affiliates in 
high-tax jurisdictions.
119
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Although, Desai, Foley and Hines found evidence of the extent to which tax 
haven activity and economic activity outside of tax havens influence each 
other. In fact the study indicate that corporations with growing opportunities 
outside of tax havens are the most likely to demand tax haven operations, 
meaning that greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven affiliate is 
associated with greater sales and investment in nearby regional non-haven 
havens.
120
 From a revenue point of view, all this evidence do not imply that 
there is always an overall benefit for high tax jurisdiction derived from 
activities of tax havens.
121
 Often, the erosion of tax base in high-tax 
countries creates revenue shortfalls that must be measured either by raising 
tax rates or by reducing government spending.
122
 But seen from an 
investment point of view, high-tax jurisdictions benefit from tax 
competition. In fact, tax-related issues for US investors in certain countries 
can be solved with the use of nearby holding regimes, which leads to the 
result that tax issues lose their relevance. Thus, investors consider factors 
such as infrastructure, education, skilled workforce, and connections to the 
consumers market.
123
 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
US foreign investments have an ambiguous impact on US tax collections, 
since reallocating foreign income from high-tax to low-tax locations 
generally increases US tax obligations by reducing foreign tax payments for 
which tax credits can be claimed. To the extent that US MNC uses tax 
havens to reduce its taxable income in the US, however, US tax collections 
will fall.
124
  
 
The demand for tax haven operations has continuously flourished the last 
decade. Sound empirical evidence provides that better-governed countries 
are much more likely to become tax havens than others.
125
 The proliferation 
of tax havens is particularly due to several reasons, namely the liberalization 
of cross border trade and investment, the improvement of communications, 
and transportation, enhanced financial services, the introduction of flexible 
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commercial regimes, strict bank secrecy and confidentiality requirements by 
the tax havens and, finally, the marketing of tax havens themselves.
126
  
 
The on-going debate concerns whether tax competition among countries is 
harmful or not. High-tax welfare states claim that the widespread use of tax 
havens could threat the sustainability of the tax base in high-tax countries. 
Tax haven activities attract MNCs for many reasons, for instance; the 
avoidance of double taxation and reduction of overall tax liabilities. What is 
at stake is the integrity of corporate income tax. As a consequence the issue 
has been raised and is currently examined by the Commission. In order to 
address base erosion and profit shifting by MNCs, an action plan is under 
development, mainly to provide countries with instruments as a way to align 
the right tax with real economic activity.
127
  
                                                 
126
 Rolf Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 99. 
127
 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD Publishing 2013) 8. 
 35 
5 Holding Company Tax 
Regimes – a Comparative 
Approach 
5.1 Sweden 
Sweden has always been considered to be a high-tax country. Nevertheless, 
Swedish tax law has created one of Europe’s most favourable tax 
environment for holding companies. Currently the competitive corporate tax 
rate is 22%, which became effective on 1
 
January 2013.
128
 Besides, Sweden 
provides very attractive rules concerning income from holdings of ‘business 
related shares’, i.e. shares that are considered to be held for business 
purposes. The tax package includes tax exemptions on capital gains from 
sales of business and dividends received from business related shares, 
deductible interest payments, no thin-capitalization rules, and no 
withholding tax imposed on dividends, interest and royalties.
129
 The 
following presentation offers the most significant aspects of Sweden’s tax 
structure in relation to the Income Tax Act (1999:1229).
130
  
 
5.1.1 Holding Companies in Scandinavia 
In a time of instability in the European market, the Scandinavian countries 
exhibit economic growth and stability. Four of these countries, Denmark, 
Norway, Iceland and Sweden, are not a member of the Eurozone, and two 
countries, Norway and Iceland, are not an EU Member State, but European 
Economic Area (“EEA”) Member States. Internationally, there are 
significant tax differences among countries. This, together with the MNC’s 
importance of the developing world trade has resulted in complex process of 
internationalization. Therefore, it is important to what extent Scandinavian 
countries, in particular Sweden, can serve as an international holding 
location and what are the possibilities for international tax planning in such 
context.
131
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There are several non-tax advantages in Sweden, for example:
132
 
 Scandinavian countries, including Sweden, exhibit economic growth 
and stability; 
 three countries are EU Member States (Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland) and Denmark, Iceland, Sweden and Norway do not have 
Euro as their currency, meaning that they are more stable during the 
current euro crises; and  
 all of the Scandinavian countries are close to the European markets.  
 
At first glance, Sweden provides several tax advantages:
133
  
 
 a competitive corporate tax rate; 
 the tax exemption applies to dividends and capital gains received by 
a Swedish company, provided that the shares are business related; 
 Sweden is an EU Member and, therefore, both the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive
134
 and the Interest and Royalty Directive
135
 are applicable. 
Generally this means that withholding taxes are not imposed on 
dividends, interest and royalties paid within the European Union; 
 Swedish law does not contain any specific thin capitalization rules;  
 interest cost are generally deductible for tax purposes; 
 no stamp duty or capital duties on share capital; and  
 an extensive double tax treaty network. 
 
5.1.2 Dividends and Capital Gains (Participation 
Exemption) 
A Swedish resident company
136
 is subject to tax on its worldwide income. 
However, dividends paid to Sweden are not subject to corporate income tax 
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on the basis of the participation exemption rules. It should be noted that 
only shares classified as capital assets may be qualified as business related 
shares for tax purposes. A non-quoted share is always deemed to be 
business related. No requirements related to the holding time or minimum 
percentages apply. Quoted shares that constitute fixed business assets are 
deemed to be business related if they represent at least 10% of the 
company’s voting rights, or are otherwise considered necessary for the 
business conducted by the shareholding company or its affiliates. A further 
condition for quoted shares is a minimum holding period of one year.
137
    
 
The definition of business related shares also involves shares in foreign 
legal entities, under the condition that the foreign entity is liable to pay taxes 
in its home jurisdiction and considered as similar to a Swedish limited 
liability company from a civil law approach.
138
  
 
Capital gains derived from the sale of shares in resident or non-resident 
companies are not subject to tax, provided that they constitute a business-
related holding. Consequently, losses are not deductible.
139
 
 
5.1.3 Withholding Tax on Dividends, Interest 
and Royalties 
According to both the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
140
 and the Interest and 
Royalty Directive
141
 withholding taxes are not imposed on dividends, 
interest and royalties paid within the EU.  
 
Under the Swedish rules governing the participation exemption rules,  
dividends distributed by a resident company to a foreign corporate 
shareholder on business related shares are exempt from withholding tax, 
provided that the recipient is considered as a ‘foreign-based company’. A 
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foreign company is defined as a legal entity and resident in a country with 
similar taxation on corporate income as Sweden. Nevertheless, there is a 
presumption of similar taxation if the company is resident in a country with 
which Sweden has signed a tax treaty. The standard rate of withholding tax 
is 30 percent, but is waived or reduced under most taxation treaties, unless 
the domestic exemption applies.
142
 
 
There is no withholding tax on interest payments.
143
 
 
Under domestic law implementing the provisions of the EU Royalties 
Directive, outbound royalty payments are not subject to withholding tax, 
provided that the beneficial owner of the royalty is an associated company 
of another Member State or such a company’s permanent establishment is 
located in another Member State.
144
 If the requirements are not fulfilled, the 
recipient is taxed in Sweden on net royalty income (that is, gross royalties 
less related expenses) at the ordinary corporate income tax rate. However, 
Sweden’s right to tax royalties is waived or reduced under most tax 
treaties.
145
 
 
5.1.4 Deductable Interest Cost and Thin 
Capitalization Rules 
Tax law in Sweden does not contain any specific rules regarding thin 
capitalization. As known, the previously restrictions from 2009 refuses tax 
deduction for interest costs on intra-group loans related to an acquisition of 
shares from an affiliate, unless the beneficial owner of the interest is taxed at 
a tax rate of least 10% on the income and is not allowed to deduct dividends 
paid; or the company can show that it had sound commercial reasons for 
both the acquisition of the shares and the debt.
146
  
  
The scope of the new rules was extended to as per 1 January 2013.
147
 In 
2009, the deductibility of certain interest payments was abolished as a 
manner to prevent certain types of tax planning. The rules, however, only 
applied to interest on debts to group companies under the condition that the 
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loan funded an intra-group stock purchase. Loans that funded external 
acquisition of shares were not covered by these rules.
148
 From now on
149
 the 
restrictions are more comprehensive and apply in respect of interest 
expenses on any loan within an affiliated group, whatever its purpose.
150
  
 
To determine whether the level of taxation is at least 10%, a hypothetical 
test is suitable to define whether the income corresponding to the interest 
cost would have been subject to at least a 10% tax on a stand-alone basis 
provided the creditor (the person entitled to the interest) would have 
received the income.
151
 Present tax rules added that this condition is not 
fulfilled if the achievement of considerable tax benefits for the group was 
the main reason behind the debt structuring.
152
  
 
For the sound commercial reason exception to apply, the company that 
demands the interest deduction has to demonstrate that the transaction and 
debt are mainly motivated by sound commercial reasons and not simply tax 
reasons.
153
Also, the creditor must be a resident within the EEA or in a tax 
treaty jurisdiction with which Sweden has a full tax treaty.  
 
Both previous and current interest deduction limitation rules have been 
criticized from various industry associations. It has been disputed whether 
the rules are compatible with EU law, in particular the freedom of 
establishment. The Commission has received several complaints regarding 
the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules. According to the 
Commission, it is unlikely that domestic intra-group loans can ever be 
considered to have arisen in order to achieve substantial tax benefit.  
Therefore, the interest deduction limitation rules only affect interest 
payments to companies that are non-resident in Sweden. As a result these 
rules constitute an indirect discrimination for companies who are not 
domiciled in Sweden and, accordingly, violate the freedom of 
establishment.
154
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The Swedish Government considers that the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules do not mean any restriction of the freedom of establishment, 
as the rules applies irrespective of where the lender is located and whether 
the borrower is limited or unlimited liable to tax. Also, the rules applies 
irrespective it is a matter of a Swedish or a foreign entity. Besides, if the 
interest deduction rules would entail a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment, the Swedish Government considers that the restriction can be 
justified by the need to maintain a balanced taxation combined with need to 
prevent tax avoidance. Thus, the Government finds that the rules are 
proportionate and that the evidence issue follows the principle, the one who 
claims a deduction has the burden of proof.
155
  
 
5.1.5 Controlled Foreign Coproration Rules 
(CFC) 
Under the controlled foreign company regime, a Swedish resident company 
or any non-resident with a permanent establishment in Sweden that holds an 
interest in a particular foreign legal entity is subject to immediate taxation 
on its proportionate share of the foreign legal entity’s profits.156 However, 
Swedish regime is only applicable if the foreign legal person is not taxed or 
if it is subject to income tax at a tax rate lower than 14.5% on its profits 
calculated according to Swedish law. To trigger the CFC regime, the 
shareholder must control, directly or indirectly, at least 25% of the voting 
rights or capital in the foreign legal entity. A shareholder in a foreign legal 
entity within the EEA treated as a CFC company is exempt from CFC 
taxation on income derived from the CFC, if the taxpayer can show that the 
foreign company is actually established in its homes state and carry out 
genuine economic activities in that state.
157
  
 
5.1.6 Deduction 
It is logical that the operation of a holding company causes expenses such as 
the management costs and interest costs for loans taken up to finance the 
company itself or subsidiary companies. A great holding jurisdiction grants 
the possibility to deduct these expenditures, despite the profits of a holding 
company is tax-exempt. In some countries deductions of expenditures like 
finance costs are not allowed, even though such a treatment infringes on the 
system of tax law. The reason for countries to do so is of fiscal nature. This 
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issue has been heavily debated, while some authors maintain that this trade-
off between tax-exempt profits and the non deductibility of expenses is the 
only reasonable justification, other authors mean that the reason profits are 
tax-exempt is to avoid double-taxation.
158
 
 
This issue has been addressed in several cases by the ECJ, in particular the 
Keller Holding case
159
, where ECJ reviewed domestic legislation that 
excluded the opportunity to deduct financing costs incurred by a parent 
company in acquiring holdings in a foreign indirect subsidiary. The ECJ 
found that there was an infringement on the freedom of establishment when 
a deduction of cross-border transaction is prohibited, but not in a pure 
domestic case.
160
 Since the freedom of movement of capital also is 
applicable in relation to third countries, the ruling of ECJ applies regarding 
US investors in Europe.
161
  
 
In the Bosal holding
162
 case the ECJ examined the question whether a 
domestic rule which delimits the deductibility of costs in connection to the 
financing of a holding in companies in another Member State was in 
accordance with the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
163
 and the freedom of 
establishment. The essence of this particular case was that the costs relating 
to a holding was not deductible (‘holding costs’), but there is an exemption 
to this non-deductibility, namely, holding costs were deductible if they were 
indirectly instrumental in making profits of the subsidiary that are taxable in 
the Member State where the parent company is established. In other words, 
holding costs that are indirectly instrumental in taxable profits being made 
in the Member State of the parent are deductible, while holding costs which 
are indirectly being made abroad are not deductible.
164
 ECJ held that the 
domestic rule cannot be deemed to be in conflict with EU law, based on the 
right of the Member State to limits the deduction of costs in connection to 
the financing of a holding in other Member States. Although, the court 
found that it was unlawful to require the profits of the subsidiaries are 
taxable in the Member State where the parent is located. Consequently, ECJ 
endorsed the freedom of establishment.
165
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It is still unclear whether or not this ruling can be applied to third countries 
relations. So far, ECJ has not appeared to draw any distinction between 
“internal EU situations” and relations with third countries.166  
 
All expenses incurred in the operation of a business are deductible i.e. 
royalties paid and interest payments.
167
 Moreover, losses incurred abroad by 
a Swedish company are deductible from Swedish-source income. Yet, if a 
tax treaty exempts foreign-source income from Swedish tax, losses arising 
from that source are not deductible from Swedish-source income.
168
 
 
5.1.7 Group Relief 
Some jurisdictions provide for a group relief, which enables the members of 
the group to aggregate profits and losses. In Sweden relief for losses 
between companies in a group is given a system of group contributions, 
which are deductible for the paying company and taxable for the receiving 
company under certain conditions.  Specifically:  
 
 “The parent company holds more than 90% of the shares of the 
subsidiary for the entire income year or since the subsidiary started 
conducting business; 
 neither the granting or receiving company is a private company or an 
investment company; 
 the group contribution is disclosed in both companies’ tax returns for 
the year in which the contribution was made; 
 the recipient is not resident in a state outside the EEA; 
 the business income to which the group contribution received is 
attributable is not exempt from tax in Sweden by virtue of tax treaty 
provisions; and  
 In the case of a contribution from a subsidiary to its parent, the 
parent is exempt from dividends received from the subsidiary in the 
same income year.”169 
 
According to the high cross-border trade among affiliated companies, it is 
crucial that no double taxation is created within a MNC. Within EU, the 
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Marks & Spencer case set the standard regarding group relief regime. See 
section 3.3.8. 
 
5.1.8 Double Taxation Relief 
In the absence of a tax treaty, Sweden resident taxpayers may credit foreign 
income levied at national or other levels against Sweden income tax 
attributable to the foreign income.
170
  
 
Sweden has an extensive double tax treaty network, and most of these 
treaties following the pattern of the OECD Model Treaty.
171
 The tax treaty 
between the US and Sweden entails the clause: ‘limitations of benefits’ 
(“LOB”). The US is very concerned about treaty shopping and thereby most 
of the tax treaties US has signed with foreign countries contain some form 
of a LOB article. The objective of the LOB article is to determine whether a 
resident of a treaty country has a sufficient connection with that country in 
order to enjoy the treaty benefits. In other words, the overall purpose of the 
Article is to limit the benefits of the treaty, what could be called ‘legitimate’ 
beneficiaries. The said Article consists of two major parts. The first part 
identifies persons who shall be entitled to relief from taxation. The second 
part stipulates one single rule, identifying certain characteristics of treaty 
shopping operations. As described above, the aim with treaty shopping is to 
avoid being taxed by the source state. Since the tax treaty has entered into 
force between Sweden and the US, the questions rises about treaty-
shopping. From an US perspective, Sweden is known as a stepping stone for 
US business who wish to reduce their tax obligations in the US. Swedish tax 
debates has not only concerned the fear that Sweden’s tax base will erode, 
but also Sweden as a state of residence. The debate regards that the 
favourable Swedish treaty will be used by persons in Sweden to channel 
home untaxed or low-taxed income via treaty-concluding states with 
Sweden. This might infringe the tax neutrality of Sweden and hence the 
state of residence. A Swedish business making foreign investments and 
making and receiving low-taxed foreign incomes could get more favorably 
taxed than other resident business in Sweden with no such income from 
foreign countries.
172
  
 
5.1.9 Anti-Avoidance Legislation  
Except the present CFC regime, interest deduction limitation rules and 
transfer pricing legislation in Sweden, the country has enacted General Anti-
Avoidance Rules (“GAAR”). In accordance with GAAR, a transaction 
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carried out can be disregarded if it produces a significant tax benefit. Thus, 
the tax benefit could be viewed as the predominant reason for the 
transaction and an assessment based on the transaction would be contrary to 
the objective of the legislation.
173
  
 
5.2 Switzerland 
In Switzerland, corporations are taxed on both their income and their equity. 
Also, the Swiss confederation, the relevant canton and the community have 
the right to tax. Switzerland provides a classic tax system, resulting in 
double taxation, i.e. profits are subject to corporate income tax while 
dividends are subject to taxation at the level of the shareholder. Although, 
the Swiss tax regime grants a participation exemption on dividend income 
and capital gains on qualifying participations.
174
 Generally there are few 
special regimes for holding companies in Europe. A notable exception is the 
Swiss tax system which provides for a special privileged holding tax regime 
for corporations at the cantonal level. This means that such companies are 
exempted from cantonal tax and thereby are simply subject to federal tax. A 
company is qualified for the holding tax regime if the drive of the company 
is to hold significant equity investments in other corporations, no active 
business activity are carried out in Switzerland and one of the following two 
conditions are met: (i) the company’s participation must represent two-
thirds of the company’s total assets, or (ii) the income derived from such 
participations must represent at least two-thirds of its total income.
175
  
 
The most common legal form of a holding company based in Switzerland is 
a corporation, but in certain cases such as check-the-box planning, holding 
companies are set up as limited-liability companies (GmbH/Sàrl). It is 
though important to keep in mind that a company is subject to ordinary 
cantonal tax legislation if the holding requirements are not met throughout a 
consecutive period of two to three business years.
176
 
 
Even though Switzerland is not a member of the EU, the country is 
connected to the bilateral and multilateral treaties of the EU and thereby has 
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access to benefits similar to the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive
177
 and the 
EU Interest and Royalty Directive.
178
  
 
5.2.1 Taxation of Holding Companies 
At the cantonal level, no income taxes are levied if a company is defined as 
a holding company. Accordingly, income from dividends, interest and 
royalties are exempted from cantonal income tax. Besides, the holding 
company also benefits from a privileged annual tax rate of 0.01% to 0.2%, 
which is definitely lower than ordinarily taxed companies.  
 
At the federal level, no special holding privileges apply. Thus, all income is 
subject to an effective federal income tax rate of 7.83%. Although, it should 
be mentioned that income resulting from capital gains on the disposal of 
qualifying participations in other companies are granted a participation 
exemption.
179
 
 
5.2.2 Dividends (Participation Exemption) 
Switzerland is generally considered to be an efficient holding location, 
mostly due to its participation exemption which is known in Switzerland as 
Beteiligungsabzug, and embodied at the federal as well as the cantonal level. 
In practice, an US foreign investor is searching for a jurisdiction that 
provides for a 100% participation exemption on the distributed profits. A 
Swiss holding company can merely live up to its purpose if the profits of its 
subsidiaries are distributed with no or a low tax burden. Another concern 
regarding the participation exemption is to distinct the rules codified in the 
national tax regime, in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
180
 and in the double 
treaties. The tax payer is bound to the first and the last, but if the national 
tax regime has to comply with EU law, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
181
 
sets the framework for the participation exemption rule.
 182
 
 
Dividends received by a holding company are normally included in the 
company’s taxable income. A participation exemption may provide relief 
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from taxations, under the condition that the participation is qualified. A 
participation normally includes shares of corporations, limited-liability 
companies and cooperatives, whether they resident or nonresident. This 
applies if the participation can be defined as (i) a participation of at least 
10% of the equity (capital stock) of a company, or (ii) a participation with a 
current market value of at least CFH
183
 1 million.
184
 
 
Companies with qualifying dividend income can reduce their corporate 
income tax liability by the following ratio:
185
 
 
Net qualifying dividend income/Total net profit = 
Corporate income tax 
 
The above ratio means that the tax payable on the corporation’s aggregate 
net income is reduced due to the ratio of net income from qualifying 
participations. But if a holding company only derives income from 
qualifying participations in subsidiaries, dividend income will nearly be 
exempted from taxation.
186
  
 
However, if the participation exemption is not applicable, a relief from 
double taxation may still be available under a tax treaty. Swiss corporations 
are generally eligible for treaty benefits if they have their corporate 
residence in Switzerland and they are the ultimate owners of the property 
producing the income in the foreign country.
187
 In 5.2.9 tax treaties 
concluded by Switzerland will be discussed 
 
5.2.3 Capital Gains 
The participation exemption is also applicable for capital gains on the sale 
of qualifying participations. In order to qualify for the participation 
exemption, capital gains must be achieved from the sale of a participation of 
at least 10% of the equity of the company that has been held for at least one 
year prior to the sale.
188
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5.2.4 Withholding Tax on Dividends, Interest 
and Royalties 
In general, a Swiss holding company is prescribed to withhold federal tax at 
a rate of 35% on dividends and interest paid to both domestic and foreign 
shareholders. Regarding Swiss resident shareholders, they are generally 
entitled to a refund for withholding tax on dividends from a Swiss company. 
According to domestic law, repatriation of a capital contribution made by 
direct shareholders is not subject to withholding tax. In most situations, one 
of approximately 90 tax treaties applies. Some even reduce or eliminate the 
withholding tax rate.
189
 As pointed out above, Switzerland has a bilateral 
agreement with the EU that enables the country to access the benefits of the 
EU Parent-Subsidiary and Interest-Royalty directives. Broadly, dividends 
between subsidiaries and parents are not subject to Swiss withholding tax 
if:
190
 
 
 the parent company has direct holding of 25% of the capital of the 
Swiss subsidiary for at least two years; and 
 one company is resident for tax purposes in an EU Member State 
and the other company is resident for tax purposes in Switzerland; 
and 
 under any double tax agreement with any third States, neither 
company is resident for tax purposes in that third State; and 
 both companies are subject to corporation tax without being 
exempted, and both adopt the form of a limited company.  
 
Swiss withholding tax does not embrace royalties, management fees, service 
fees and technical assistant fees. Although, if the royalties are paid to an 
affiliate and are deemed to be excessive, the will be treated as a hidden 
distribution of profits and subject to withholding tax.
191
 
   
Swiss law distinct between ordinary loans of a Swiss borrower and bonds 
issued by Swiss debtors and on Swiss bank deposits. Although, if the 
interest is paid to an affiliate and are deemed to be excessive, it will be 
treated as a hidden distribution of profits and subject to withholding tax. 
Interest payments on ordinary loans are not subject to withholding tax, 
whereas interest payments on Swiss bonds and deposits at Swiss banks are 
subject to withholding tax at rate of 35%.
192
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Cross border interest and royalties payments between associated companies 
qualify for an exemption of withholding tax when:
193
 
 
 such companies are affiliated by a direct a direct minimum holding 
of 25% for at least two years, or a both held by a third company that 
has directly a minimum holding of 25% both in the capital of the 
first company and the capital of the second company for at least two 
years; and 
 a company is resident for tax purposes or a permanent establishment 
is located in a Member State and the other company is resident for 
tax purposes or the other permanent establishment is located in 
Switzerland; and  
 under any double tax treaties with any third party, none of the 
companies is resident for tax purposes in that third country and none 
of the permanent establishments is situated in that third state; and 
 all companies are subject to corporate income tax, and each adopts 
the legal form of a limited liability company.  
 
5.2.5 Deduction 
Concerning deductibility of unrealized capital losses, impairments on 
participations are deductible as long as they are commercially justified and 
disclosed in the company’s financial statement. It is up to the tax authorities 
to revalue the impairments on the qualifying participations.
194
  
 
Realized capital losses on the sale of participations, acquisition costs and 
costs on disposal are deductible for income tax purposes.
195
 
 
5.2.6 Thin Capitalization Rules 
The Swiss thin capitalization rules are not identified in the tax law per se. 
Instead, a circular letter of the SFTA containing safe harbour rules on the 
maximum amount of debt allowed for a company.
196
 An asset-based test is 
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federal used to determine if a company is adequately financed. These rules 
require that each asset class is endorsed by a certain amount of equity.
197
  
 
5.2.7 Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules 
(CFC) 
Switzerland does not have any CFC legislation.
198
  
 
5.2.8 Group Relief 
The Swiss tax jurisdiction does not provide a group relief regime.
199
  
 
5.2.9 Tax Treaty Network 
One of the major advantages of Switzerland is its broad tax treaty network. 
Today, Switzerland has concluded 89 tax treaties. Most tax treaties follow 
the principles laid down in the traditional OECD Model Treaty. The main 
sources of international treaty law are to be found in bilateral or multilateral 
tax treaties (conventions). Since Switzerland is a party to no multinational 
tax treaties, Swiss treaty law is primarily based on bilateral treaties.
200
  
 
Where an exclusive right to tax a given type of income is granted to one of 
the Contracting States, the other one is precluded from taxing such income. 
The OECD Model Treaty stipulated that an exclusive right is granted to a 
Contracting State when a relevant Article indicates that the income in 
question “shall be taxable only” in one Contracting State. Thereby, double 
taxation is avoided.  
 
Income which is taxed in the state of residence “may be taxed” in the state 
of source, thus the attribution of the right to tax is not exclusive. In order to 
eliminate double taxation the OECD Model Treaty proposes for two 
different methods, the exemption method and the credit method.
201
 Under 
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the exemption method, the country of residence has to exempt income 
derived from the country of source. However, some treaties prescribe for a 
subject-to-tax rule that allows the exemption method only if the income is 
effectively subject to income tax in the other Contracting State.
202
  
 
Traditionally, Switzerland has always been in favour of granting an 
exclusive right of taxation to the state of residence. This approach has not 
always been followed since the OECD Model Treaty grants a limited right 
of taxation to the state of source of dividend and interest income.
203
 As a 
consequence, double taxation is not fully avoided since there remains an 
unrecoverable amount of tax in the state of source. To solve this problem, 
Switzerland has introduced the credit method regarding dividends, interest 
and royalties derived by Swiss companies in other Contracting States. Under 
the credit method, both countries keep the right to tax income. However, the 
country of residence has to credit the tax of the source country against its 
own tax.
204
  
 
5.2.10 Anti-Avoidance Legislation  
Every tax jurisdiction is forced to protect itself against tax planning that 
might results in abuse. This is also evident from the fact that states 
implement the doctrine of GAAR in their tax code or strengthening their 
existing tax code. Despite the taxpayer friendly area, tax planners have to be 
careful when dealing with international tax law. As a general matter, a 
transaction may be disregarded for tax purposes if the following conditions 
are met:
205
 
 
 the legal structure used by the taxpayer is abnormal or artificial and 
has no commercial basis; or 
 tax considerations are estimated to be the only motive for the 
transaction; or  
 the transaction results in a substantial tax benefit for the taxpayer. 
 
Treaty shopping is widely regarded as a legitimate tool of international tax 
planning, on the notion that taxpayers are free to organize their economic 
actions in ways that are most favorable for the MNC. The Swiss federal 
government has issued two rulings to prevent Swiss companies from 
inappropriately demanding benefits under tax treaties. If a significant part of 
the benefits would be enjoyed by companies not entitled to them, the 
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transaction will be deemed abusive and will not be granted. However these 
rules do not apply to the tax treaty between Switzerland and the US, as the 
treaty contains its own anti-abusive provisions.
206
 
 
It should be noted that, since the Swiss anti-abuse provisions simply apply 
to income created from outbound foreign investments, they do not protect 
Swiss taxes against the inappropriate use of tax treaties. Indeed, the purpose 
of these rules is to avoid the abusive reduction of foreign withholding 
taxes.
207
  
 
5.3 Planning techniques by US MNCs 
Based on the foregoing, the following structures will help US MNCs to 
implement a tax efficient tax structure in Sweden or Switzerland. The 
research does not pretend to be exhaustive and complete, but rather provides 
an overview of the most common models in international tax planning by 
US MNCs.   
 
5.3.1 In Sweden 
The Swedish tax regime includes certain positive attributes, such as zero 
statutory withholding on outgoing dividends, interest, and royalty payments, 
deductible interest payments, lack of thin capitalization rules, tax exemption 
on capital gains and dividends, competitive corporate tax, an extensive tax 
treaty network, group relief for foreign subsidiaries, and double taxation 
relief.  
 
The most well-known tax planning strategy is certainly treaty shopping. 
This form has become a popular tool for US investors to repatriate profits, 
since withholding tax on dividends, interest, and royalty payments are nil. 
Basically, avoiding withholding taxes is the first and the foremost task of a 
tax planner.  
 
If a US MNC decides to interpose a holding company in Sweden, it can 
repatriate dividends to Sweden from other affiliates within Europe without 
any withholding tax due to the Parent Subsidiary Directive. If treaty 
shopping is a good option for a US investor mainly depends on whether or 
not a direct distribution would create a lower overall tax burden.
208
 Even 
though this may be the most utilized tax planning model, there are several 
obstacles on the road back home to the US. The US taxpayer has to consider 
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whether the structure runs the risk of triggering the Subpart F regime. The 
regime itself capture ‘bad income’ that is majority-owned by a US MNC, 
namely 50%. As regards a Swedish holding company that possesses 
intangibles, it is a decisive factor that the company performing economic 
activity outside the US.
209
 Since the US-Sweden Treaty contains a LOB 
clause, which excludes certain residents from treaty benefits, the US MNC 
has to ensure that it is not covered by this provision. Finally, the Swedish 
holding company must fulfill the minimum holding requirement that is 
needed for the withholding reduction.  
 
 
Table 1: Treaty Shopping – Zero Withholding Tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the model in Table 2, a US MNC establishing a hybrid holding entity 
in Sweden in order to relieve interest expenses both in the hybrid’s own 
jurisdiction, Sweden, and in that of its members, for instance the US. 
Typically, the hybrid will have a funding loss due to interest on loans to 
finance its subsidiaries. Such loss may be relievable in the country of the 
members due to the Swedish hybrid’s transparency in the US, but at the 
same time it can be relievable in Sweden due to the deduction of interest 
payments. A different model is when the members are the ones who 
borrowing externally and lend to the hybrid in Sweden. Instead of claiming 
relief for the interest in Sweden, the US MNC does not recognize the 
interest income on the loans that the US parent company makes to the 
hybrid (because of the transparency of the latter). Meanwhile, the US MNC 
may claim tax relief for the interest on the external borrowing.
210
 This 
means that there is an opportunity to legally circumvent the Subpart F 
regime. By performing a check-the-box election, a US investor can benefit 
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0% WHT 
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from the Parent Subsidiary Directive, and financing its subsidiaries within 
EU withholding tax-free.
211
  
 
Swedish tax law does not contain any specific rules regarding thin 
capitalization. However, compliance of the new rules concerning 
deductibility of interest costs is of particular interest, since it depends on the 
US MNC to demonstrate whether the transaction is motivated by sound 
commercial reasons and not simply tax reasons.
212
 From the 1 January 2013, 
the restrictions are more comprehensive and apply in respect of interest 
expenses on any loan within an affiliated group, whatever its purpose.   
 
 
Table 2: Treaty Shopping and Check-the-Box Rules – Using Hybrid Entities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Suppose that a US MNC plans to acquire a company in Sweden (called 
Sweden AB), which will be financed with external bank debt and the 
MNC’s retained earnings. In order to carry out the acquisition, the US MNC 
sets up a holding company in Netherlands, which receiving an intra-group 
loan. The Dutch holding company in turn sets up a holding company in 
Sweden. The Swedish holding subsidiary is partly financed through a loan 
from the Dutch holding company and partly with an external bank loan. 
Thus, it is possible for the Swedish holding to acquire Sweden AB. See 
Table 3. 
 
By combing a tax haven with a non-haven holding company location, an 
effective tax rate close to nil can be achieved. The debt-push ensures that the 
external bank loan is deducted from Sweden AB’s income through the 
applicable group tax regimes. The loan from Dutch holding to the Swedish 
holding company will be treated as a debt in Sweden while it is treated as 
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equity in the Netherlands, according to applicable rules of deductibility of 
interest costs.  
 
 
Table 3: Leveraged
213
 Acquisition with Debt-Push Down and Use of an 
Intermediate Holding Company in Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2 In Switzerland 
In general, there are few special holding regimes in Europe, Switzerland is a 
notable exemption. The country provides for a privileged holding tax regime 
for corporations at the cantonal level, which means that holding companies 
are simply subject to federal tax. Swiss tax regime also offering favourable 
participation exemptions for a US investor and does not have any CFC 
rules. However, a US MNC must observe the circular letter issued by the 
SFTA. Instead of thin capitalization rules, the circular letter contains safe 
harbour rules on the maximum amount of debt allowed for a company. 
These rules do not allow the deduction of interest expenses on borrowings 
used to finance equity in subsidiaries. A similar problem arises in the US, 
where interest expense is in principle deductible but, if the subsidiary is 
located abroad, reduces the sum of foreign income and therefore the 
maximum amount of double tax relief that can be claimed in the US.
214
 
According to Switzerland’s broad tax treaty network a US taxpayer has 
several choices where to invest in subsidiaries.  
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Table 4: Treaty Shopping – Zero Withholding Tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
Sweden and Switzerland are two countries with tax regimes that provide 
both similarities and differences. Sweden’s tax structure is designed to meet 
the needs of foreign investors. Briefly, the tax package include a 
competitive corporate tax rate, participation exemption on dividends and 
capital gains, no thin capitalization rules and concerning the group relief 
regime, Marks & Spencer has open new doors for cross-border trade under 
certain conditions. In other words, Sweden was predicted to be a beneficial 
jurisdiction for foreign investors and the Swedish tax legislation encouraged 
foreign investors to set up a holding company in the country. As of 1st of 
January 2013, the new interest deduction limitation rules were implemented. 
Practically, these rules caused a significant skeptical attitude among foreign 
MNCs. However, both existing and potential MNCs with a Swedish 
presence consider the new rules acceptable, as far as the deduction would be 
possible to calculate in a model scheme. Instead the scope of the new rules – 
covering intra-group loan irrespective of its purpose – create uncertainty 
concerning the concept “sound business reasons”.215 
 
Switzerland is generally considered to be an efficient holding jurisdiction. 
Even though the country is not an EU Member State, Switzerland offers 
similar tax advantages as Sweden. To mention some, none of the countries 
are a member of the Eurozone, the common participation exemption, 
deduction on all expenses incurred by business operations, no withholding 
taxes on dividends, interest and royalties, no thin capitalization rules but 
limitation on interest deduction, and a comprehensive treaty tax network. In 
contradiction to Sweden, Switzerland does not maintain any CFC-regime 
and have a specific holding regime at the cantonal level.  
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In summary, Switzerland may not be the first choice as a pure holding 
location. However, the country offers a very attractive holding regime for 
groups that want to seek a Swiss listing or that have some other Swiss 
connection.
216
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6 Tax Treatment of Foreign 
Business Operations and 
Investments by US 
Businesses 
6.1 General  
US taxpayers include primarily UC citizens, resident aliens and US 
corporations. Notably, a partnership is not a taxpayer and its operation is 
allocated to the various partners according to the terms stipulated in the 
partnership agreement. Whether a foreign entity is classified as a 
corporation or a partnership is based on US tax purposes by US law. The US 
government taxes both the domestic and the foreign income of businesses 
that are incorporated in the US and operating abroad, irrespective of the 
currency which it is paid and irrespective of the place it is deposit. The 
activity of a foreign branch by a US corporation results in an immediate tax 
liability due to the rule of worldwide taxability.
217
 A flat tax rate of 35% 
applies to the taxable income for the year equal or greater than USD 
18.333.333.  
 
Federal tax law begins with the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”), enacted by 
the Congress in Title 26 of the US Code (“26 USC”).  Treasury regulations 
(“26 CFR”), also referred to as Federal tax regulations, pick up where the 
IRC leaves off by providing the official interpretation of the IRC by the US 
Department of the Treasury. In addition to participating in the promulgation 
of Treasury Tax Regulations, the IRS publishes other forms of official tax 
guidance, such as revenue rulings, revenue procedures, notices and 
announcements.
218
  
 
Domestic corporations
219
 are taxed by the federal government on worldwide 
income, including income from branches, whether repatriated or not. Profits 
derived from foreign subsidiaries are not taxed, until they are repatriated as 
dividends, unless they are subject to the Subpart F regime.
220
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The worldwide approach maintained by US can be viewed as harsh, 
however, the taxation can be mitigated in two ways. First of all, a foreign 
subsidiary of a US corporation is not a US taxpayer, thereby it is possible to 
defer taxes through the use of a foreign company. Secondly, the rule of 
worldwide taxability is supplemented with a valuable provision that 
allowing US taxpayers to credit its foreign income taxes paid on foreign 
incomes.
221
 Although, the corporate tax rate of 35% applies.  
 
The US tax law does not provide for specific holding regime, which means 
that a US holding company would be taxed on the basis of the entire 
worldwide income at a tax rate of 35%. From a US investor’s perspective it 
would be a profitable option to establish a holding company abroad to route 
the worldwide income of a US MNC.
222
   
 
6.2 Entity Classification and Check-the-
Box Regulations  
An excellent planning tool is the US check-the-box regulations.
223
 These 
regulations offer an opportunity to decide whether a foreign entity is defined 
as a corporation or a partnership for US tax purpose. If a foreign entity is 
defined as a fiscally transparent partnership, the income accruing to a US 
participant will be immediately taxed in the US, regardless if no profits are 
repatriated. In the opposite situation, if the foreign entity is regarded as a 
corporation, US taxes are deferred until repatriation. The choice results in 
dramatic opportunities for tax planning, except in certain situations when a 
foreign entity is required to be treated as a corporation.
224
 The so-called 
‘check-the-box regulations’ can therefore fulfill all kind of uses, such as 
repatriation through debt push down arrangements to help legally 
circumvent the Subpart F rules (discussed in the forthcoming section 6.5) or 
virtually consolidate a group of companies.
225
 
 
6.3 The Foreign Tax Credit 
The US Foreign Tax Credit (“FTC”) is fundament reason why tax deferral is 
a primal goal in US international tax planning.
226
 Under the rule of 
worldwide taxation, the US government considers all of the income of its 
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MNCs to be taxable, in other words this entails that the taxpayer abroad will 
be subject to double taxation because the country in which the activity or 
transaction occurs is also entitled to exercising its taxing jurisdiction. In 
order to avoid the imposition of additional tax burdens, the US taxpayer is 
assured to claim a foreign tax credit due to the actual taxes paid 
elsewhere.
227
 The FTC sets out in the 26 USC §§ 901-909, besides tax 
treaties endorse the obligation of the US to mitigate double taxation. Even 
though, it is worth highlighting that these rules are available whether or not 
a foreign tax payer is a resident of a treaty partner country or not.
228
 
 
6.4 US Controlled Foreign Corporation 
Rules (Subpart F) 
The deferral privilege is a vehicle for US MNCs in their tax planning 
strategy, and could be seen as a blessing for US investors when operating 
abroad. As much as the basic rules for taxing foreign income earned by US 
investors provide an opportunity to defer taxes, it also cause a concern for 
the governments and lawmakers. During the early 1960s, US lawmakers 
introduced the Subpart F regime to the IRC, the so-called anti-deferral 
provisions or CFC rules.
229
 The fundamental rationale behind anti-deferral 
regimes in general, and thus the Subpart F rules, is to discourage US 
corporations from shifting income to foreign base companies that are 
located in low-tax jurisdictions.
230
 It should also be mentioned that the 
Subpart F include income from passive investment as well as several other 
types of income whose geographic source is easy to manipulate.
231
 A 
foreign corporation is a CFC if the US shareholders own more than 50% of 
the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or of the 
total value of the stock of the corporation.
232
 A US shareholder defines as 
US citizens, residents, corporations, partnerships, trusts, or estates owing 
directly or indirectly 10% or more or the total combined voting power of a 
foreign corporation.
233
 The Subpart F income includes dividends, rents, 
royalties, certain capital gains, foreign currency gains, and loan commitment 
fees.
234
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6.5 Concluding Remarks 
This study does not contain an in-depth analysis of the US income tax 
system, however, the above presentation provides a glance of the basic rules 
that apply to foreign business operations and investment by US businesses. 
US tax law does not offering a specific holding company regimes, therefore, 
a holding would be taxed on the basis of the entire worldwide income at a 
tax rate of 35%. Thereby, it is more suitable for a US MNC to establish a 
holding company abroad to route the worldwide income of US MNCs via 
such a foreign entity. Yet this company must comply with diverse US rules 
that were pointed out above.  
 
As aforementioned, the present US tax system, in particular the credit rules, 
discourage US MNCs to establish a holding company abroad to repatriate 
profits. Therefore, US MNCs are convenient to rather use low-tax 
jurisdiction or tax-havens in connection with allocation strategies than 
repatriation strategies. This is the reason why US MNCs do not always 
benefit from tax planning operations abroad. Besides the Subpart F rules, 
creates another hassle for US foreign direct investment abroad. The 
rationale behind the anti-deferral regime and the Subpart F rules is to 
discourage US corporations from shifting income to foreign companies 
located in jurisdictions with advantageous tax regime. Yet check-the-box tax 
planning is a delicate tool to use in order to circumvent the Subpart F 
rules.
235
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7 Analysis 
Repatriations are important for US investors, who gain access to their 
foreign subsidiaries profits, but also for the US government, which are not 
allowed to tax foreign profits until they are repatriated. The US economy 
depends on repatriated funds to induce growth, wealth, and welfare. 
Consequently, repatriations are double-edged for US MNCs. On the one 
hand, they provide liquidity, investment opportunities, and power. But on 
the other hand, previously deferred foreign non-Subpart F earnings are 
subject to US taxation. From an US perspective, repatriating may not be the 
most tax efficient way, and can cause double-taxation. Thus, US investors 
use holding companies not merely to repatriate funds, but also to allocate 
them.
236
    
 
There is a growing perception that governments, particularly in Europe, are 
losing substantial corporate tax revenues because of various tax planning 
strategies by US MNCs. These tax planning strategies are aimed at shifting 
profits in ways that move the taxable base to locations where they are 
subject to a more favourable tax treatment. Several US MNCs have been 
criticized for their complex tax planning schemes through complex holding 
companies. In particular, European governments have considered these 
kinds of cross-border activities by US investors as ‘immoral’ in a time of 
recession. However, everything these companies are doing is legal, it is 
avoidance not evasion. For instance, H&M was accused of skipping tax 
payments in Bangladesh. The trade minister of Bangladesh, Muhammad 
Faruk Khan, said that H&M’s action were legal but immoral. H&M 
responded that since the company does not have any turnover in 
Bangladesh, the firm is not obliged to pay any corporation tax there. H&M 
disagree with the immorality since the company contributes to the 
development of Bangladesh by placing orders for manufacturing for large 
sums, which generate hundred thousand jobs.
237
  
 
On this basis, it has been disclosed that current national tax standards may 
not have kept pace with changes in the global business practice. Today it is 
possible to be heavily involved in the economic life in another country by 
doing business with customers located in that country, without having a 
taxable presence there. In an era where non-resident taxpayers have the 
opportunity to derive major profits from transacting with customers located 
in another state, questions are being raised on whether present legislation are 
fit for purpose. This study indicates obviously that MNCs increasingly 
integrate across borders, and tax rules often remain uncoordinated. Thus, 
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numbers of structures are taking place by MNCs, technically legal, which 
take advantage of the interface between tax rules of different countries.
238
  
 
The research has presented several tax planning strategies by US MNCs. As 
mentioned, the described structures have been given a wide coverage in 
order to contain various tax planning opportunities that appear to be 
perfectly legal under the tax scheme of the countries in which they have 
been put in place.  
 
One technique typical of what Facebook, Google, and Apple are using is the 
so-called ‘Double Irish and a Dutch Sandwich’.  
 
If the profits from the sale of a product stay in the US, they would clearly be 
subject to tax of 35%. But if the money is paid to an Irish subsidiary as 
royalties on patents the company owns, it can definitely be taxed at far 
lower tax rates.
239
  
 
An US based parent company that initially develop technology and 
intangibles can forms a holding company in a low-tax jurisdiction or a tax 
haven, such as Ireland, Netherlands, or Luxemburg. Under this kind of tax 
planning structure, the US parent signs a contract giving European rights to 
its intangible property to the holding company. In return, the Irish company 
agrees to handle the MNC’s sales through its subsidiary sales company. 
Thus, all the European income is taxed in Ireland instead of the US. It is 
though usual that the Irish holding company is controlled by managers 
elsewhere, like Bermuda. Then the Irish holding company claims company 
management in Bermuda with a 0% tax rate for corporate income tax. By 
adding the model the ‘Dutch Sandwich’, another layer of complexity will be 
involved, however, additional tax savings can be made. To date, the 
structure is the same, but sandwiched between the Irish holding company 
and the Irish sales subsidiary is a Dutch subsidiary formed. The Dutch 
subsidiary collects royalties from the sales subsidiary and then transfers 
them to the Irish holding company. The rationale behind this structure is that 
the Irish operation avoids even the lower Irish tax of 12.5%, but also, the 
Irish withholding taxes.
240
   
 
One technique for a US MNC to lower its tax burden is a reduction of 
withholding taxes, which can be achieved by applying the EU Parent-
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Subsidiary Directive
241
 and a US tax treaty with an EU Member State that 
provides for a 0% withholding tax on dividends distribution. Yet there are a 
few obstacles on the road back to the US. First, certain requirements 
regarding withholding tax reductions must be fulfilled. Secondly, the 
taxpayer has to comply with minimum requirements in the respective anti-
treaty-shopping rules and the anti-abuse provisions. Finally, it has to be 
ensured that the treaty is applicable in the light of the LOB clause.
242
  
 
Another method of shifting profits from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax 
one is to borrow more in the high-tax jurisdiction. An US MNC operates in 
a number of countries, for example Switzerland, but has plans to acquire a 
manufacturing company resident in the UK. In order to carry out the 
acquisition, the US MNC sets up a holding company in Switzerland which 
receives an intra-group loan. The Swiss holding company in turn sets up a 
company in the UK which acquires the manufacturing company in UK, with 
loans partly from the holding in Switzerland. This financing is treated as a 
debt in UK while it is treated as equity in Switzerland. As a consequence the 
interest payment can be deducted for the subsidiary in the UK. Meanwhile, 
the payment will be treated as a dividend and falling under the domestic 
exemption rules.
243
  
 
The check-the-box provisions have greatly expanded the tax planning 
opportunities for US MNCs. These provisions were originally intended to 
simplify questions of whether a firm was a corporation or a partnership. 
Instead their application has led to an expansion of hybrid entities, where an 
entity can be regarded as a corporation by one jurisdiction but not by 
another. For example an US subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction can lend to 
its subsidiary in a high-tax country, and deduct the interest payments 
because the high-tax country considers the firm as a separate corporation. 
Generally, interest received by the subsidiary in the low-tax country would 
be considered as a passive subject under the US Subpart F rules. However, 
under check-the-box rules, the high-tax corporation can elect to be 
disregarded as a separate entity, meaning that there is no interest paid 
because the two firms are the same entity. With this method a US MNC can 
escapes the Subpart F rules under US taxation.
244
  
 
Income from a low-tax country that is received in the US can avoid US 
taxes because of cross crediting, namely, the use of excess foreign taxes 
paid in one jurisdiction to offset US tax that would be due on other income. 
In order to limit cross crediting, foreign tax credits have been captured in 
different baskets, a cross crediting of passive and active income is limited or 
impossible. Thus, US investors may find it harsh to fine-tuning dividend 
                                                 
241
 Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003 amending Directive 90/435/EEC 
on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and 
subsidiaries of different Member States [2003] OJ L007/41. 
242
 Rolf  Eicke, Tax planning with Holding Companies: Repatriation of US Profits from 
Europe (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Kluwer Law International 2009) 374. 
243
 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (OECD Publishing 2013) 81. 
244
 Ibid. 11 and 12. 
 64 
distributions to avoid excess tax credits. To gain flexibility and to repatriate 
funds when they are needed, the US MNC has to establish two holding 
companies that can act when the US parent require low-taxed income or the 
reverse.
245
  
 
International tax planning provides US MNCs with a wide range of 
possibilities to reflect upon when repatriating US profits from Europe. Even 
though this study attempts to give some insight of planning techniques, also 
restrictions from EU law, domestic law, and initiatives of international 
organizations have been considered. At the end, no taxpayer can be forced 
to pay more taxes than necessary according to the applicable law.
246
 If a US 
MNC chose to allocate its profits within the boundaries of law, international 
tax planning is neither illegal nor immoral (because tax planning is not 
prohibited). Despite the fact that OECD and governments around the world 
are deeming tax planning activity immoral, there is no support for this in the 
legislation. According to the globalization, it is easy to say that domestic 
and international tax rules on cross-border profits have not kept pace with 
the changing business environment.  
 
Countries work to ensure the highest level of growth in order to achieve the 
highest level of well-being. As growth depends on investments, including 
foreign investments, governments are often under the pressure to offer a 
competitive tax environment. Although, governments have accepted that 
there are limits and that they should not engage in harmful tax practices.
247
  
 
There may not be a magic recipe to achieve a more satisfying relationship 
between taxpayers and tax planners on the one side, and tax authorities, 
governments and legislation on the other side. But to close legal tax 
planning loopholes, more revised legislations and guidelines are required 
due to the economic progresses made in the business environment. 
Government actions should be more comprehensive and exhibit all various 
tax matters. Co-ordination is the key. 
 
Sweden and Switzerland are countries that offering similar tax legislation 
regarding foreign investments. Switzerland has no CFC-rules and also 
provides a particular advantageous holding regime at a cantonal level. 
Switzerland is not a Member State, which means it can create its own 
investment environment. Even though Switzerland managed to conclude an 
agreement with the EU, which Swiss companies enjoy benefits similar to 
the provisions in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, there are some issues that 
are not identical. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive grants the Member States 
to establish anti-abuse provisions. Since the Member States have used this 
right effectively, the ECJ has many cases to decide on whether or not anti-
abuse provisions comply with the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. Another 
downside is that Switzerland cannot take part of the taxpayer friendly tax 
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regime that has been shaped in the course of harmonization of the national 
tax systems of the Member States.
248
  
 
Sweden was predicted to be a perfect holding location for foreign 
investments according to its competitive corporate tax rate, participation 
exemption, no thin capitalization rules, and no withholding tax on 
dividends, interest and royalties. Several complaints to the Commission 
have revealed that the new interest deduction limitation rules have caused 
substantial uncertainty for foreign investors. Until the interest deduction 
limitation rules are more clear and specified, US investors will be reluctant 
to choose Sweden as a holding jurisdiction.  
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8 Conclusion 
By using a variety of techniques that has been presented in this study, US 
MNCs can shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions in order to 
repatriate and allocate profits. In the end, there is neither a perfect holding 
location nor a perfect repatriation strategy. This analysis described 
structures that have been given a wide coverage in order to contain various 
tax planning opportunities that appear to be perfectly legal under the tax 
scheme of the countries in which the holding companies have been put in 
place. However, it is of importance to separate the legal and the moral 
aspects. Whether or not Google, Facebook, Starbucks, Apple, and Amazon 
avoid US taxes by using legal tax planning loopholes, they are not doing 
anything illegal. From a foreign investor perspective, Sweden and 
Switzerland have all characteristics to create a pure tax haven. From a legal 
perspective, we have now seen that it is not only a unilateral issue, instead it 
is a question how to reconcile international tax law with an ever-changing 
business environment.  
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